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Evaluation Process  
Evaluations commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
Senior Management were introduced in SDC in 2002 with the aim of providing a more 
critical and independent assessment of SDC activities. These Evaluations are conducted 
according to the OECD DAC Evaluation Standards and are part of SDC's concept for 
implementing Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution which requires Swiss Federal Offices 
to analyse the effectiveness of their activities. Joint SDC/SECO1 programs are evaluated 
jointly. 
SDC's Senior Management (consisting of the Director General and the heads of SDC's 
departments) approves the Evaluation Program. The Evaluation and Corporate 
Controlling Division, which is outside of line management and directly reporting to the 
Director General, commissions the evaluations, taking care to recruit evaluators with a 
critical distance from SDC. 
Country and regional strategy evaluations 
Country and regional strategy evaluations constitute central instruments of the new SDC 
Evaluation Policy (2013). They are mandated and coordinated by SDC’s Evaluation and 
Corporate Controlling Division.  
Until 2007, SDC’s Cooperation Strategies (CS) were assessed by independent evaluation 
teams. In September 2010, the Board of Directors mandated the Evaluation and 
Corporate Controlling Division to introduce a new approach with a stronger focus on 
learning and the application of a relatively high degree of standardization. In fulfilling the 
strengthened learning objective, assessments of CS’s are realised by means of hybrid 
evaluations, which are conducted by a mixed team consisting of one external consultant 
and two internal resource persons of SDC (“peers”). 
The goal of country and regional strategy evaluations is to assess the relevance and 
coherence of the Swiss development cooperation in regard to national development 
priorities and the Federal Council Dispatch. They assess the results achievement of the 
CS portfolio at the level of domains of intervention and according to the performance of 
the CS implementation (management and monitoring mechanisms). In doing so, these 
evaluations help SDC’s Management in their strategic and operational steering and in 
improving aid effectiveness. 
The objectives of country and regional strategy evaluations include the following:  
• To assess – through a mutual learning process – whether SDC and its partners 
reach the strategic objectives in the country or region, as defined in the CS, and to 
appraise the efficiency of the strategic and operational steering mechanisms of the 
Cooperation Office; 
• To timely build the foundation for the definition of key elements for the new CS; 
• To assess the significance of the Swiss contribution to national (and regional) 
development results, and to identify key factors, which enhance or hinder aid 
performance and results achievements; 
• To identify good practices and innovative approaches as well as share 
experiences in managing CS. 
  
                                               
1 State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO 
  
The evaluation results are based on the analysis of existing documents and are 
augmented by a field mission which includes peer exchanges and semi-structured 
interviews along the four Evaluation Areas: EA1 Context analysis, EA2 Relevance and 
appropriateness of projects/programmes with regard to the current strategy, EA 3 
Implementation of the strategy and its portfolio and EA 4 Results achieved in relation to 
the results at country level. The Final Evaluators' Report is published together with the 





Terms of Reference of the evaluation October 2013 
Desk study and inception report October 2013 
Peer review on-site and final report November 2013 
Final evaluation report February 2014 
Management Response SDC  April 2014 
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I. Management Response 
 
Management Response to the Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy - Regional 
Program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (IJSL) 2010 – 2014  
by SDC Humanitarian Aid: E/MM Division 
 
General appreciation of the Evaluation report 
We would like to thank the Evaluation team for its thorough analysis and evaluation of the 
Cooperation Strategy – Regional Programme Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010 – 
2014. E/MM highly appreciates this very timely exercise as the context of its intervention 
has dramatically transformed and as it is about to elaborate a new Cooperation Strategy 
2015 – 2018. The valuable questions, remarks, inputs and recommendations made by the 
Evaluation team will certainly benefit this exercise. 
The final evaluation report is very well written and structured capturing very well the main 
challenges and allowing to easily identify the conclusions and recommendations, be it in 
the evaluation abstract or in the developed analysis. Besides being a substantial exercise 
of institutional self-critique, this report represents a key strategic milestone and gives the 
necessary elements for the elaboration of the future coming SDC engagement / strategy 
in this region. 
The Evaluation team very well identified and analyzed both the institutional and the 
environment challenges. The E/MM Division – field and HQ – shares most of the findings 
and recommendations made by the report. However, the findings and recommendations 
constitute an ideal basis for discussions towards the new Cooperation Strategy. The 
following Management Response is drafted by HQ but integrates comments and 
responses from the regional office in Amman. 




Director Hum. Aid 
Rudi von Planta 
Head a.i., E/MM 
Yvan Loehle 




Management Response by Evaluation Area 
Evaluation Area 1: Context analysis – Choices “How to adapt” 
 
Purpose: Appraise how well the CS reflects the development priorities of the partner country and the policies of the Federal Council 
Dispatch (FCD) 
 
Recommendations to: Management Response 
1.1 Positioning and adaptation of the strategy with respect to 
countries and regional contexts and Swiss policies  
R1 At SDC HQ, conditions for swift reaction to exceptional 
situations, which are likely to be protracted, should be revised. 
Expanding existing activities with known partners, fewer projects with 
higher financial volumes and in-built longer term goals are options to 
be emphasized. 
Keeping in mind that this situation partly results from unexpected 
additional CHF 20 mio funding (June 2013), E/MM fully agrees on 
the principle with this recommendation and has already taken 
measures to implement it. 
R2 In complex situations requiring urgent responses, choices for 
allocating financial and human resources in SDC Offices are to make 
optimum use of resources already in place. 
E/MM is aware that a major crisis (like the current Syrian war) has 
a strong impact on human and financial resources in a field office 
as well as at HQ. E/MM is constantly trying to adapt to the rapidly 
changing context, be it with additional human or financial 
resources. E/MM takes note of the recommendation of the PR 
team and continues improving and optimizing the use of resources.  
R3 Medium term scenarios of the evolution in the region and in 
single countries are to be developed for the planning of future Swiss 
interventions, helping to define and quickly adapt respective 
“weighting” of Swiss interventions (intervention areas, modalities, 
choice of partners). They provide a sound basis for Task Force 
discussions and decisions. 
During a Mid Term Review (MTR) exercise in 2012, scenarios have 
been developed. Nevertheless, it was difficult to foresee the current 
worst case scenario (not only for SDC). But indeed, the weakness 
not much of the scenarios themselves but rather of the related 
programmatic changes, has made it the adaptation of the Swiss 
interventions to the dramatic transformation of the humanitarian 
situation in the region more difficult. The elaboration of the future 
WOGA / joint Cooperation Strategy will include a profound common 
context analysis including the development of scenarios in order to 
facilitate the possible adaptation of the Swiss interventions. 
E/MM considers that its response was quick and efficient, despite 
the several interferences from the political division which resulted in 
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important additional work for HQ at a critical moment. 
1.2 Quality of context analysis  
R4 The new Cooperation Strategy for the region is to be drafted in 
2014, based on a joint analysis of Swiss stakeholders and on 
scenarios. 
E/MM agrees on this recommendation. The process will be 
launched in May 2014 and will last until 2015. Scenarios will be 
developed. 
R5 Given the high probability of a protracted crisis, choices have to 
be made regarding the selection of partner countries, the definition of 
domains and target groups, and the financial volume and types of 
cooperation with them as well as the instruments used. Lebanon 
appears to be the one country in the region where Switzerland can 
make a difference: positive results and impact are potentially big, 
because of the country’s dimensions, increased fragility and local 
needs. 
Today, the protracted nature of the crisis is evident (estimated to a 
minimum of 5 to 8 years). Undoubtedly, Lebanon shows the most 
worrying signs of fragility, mainly for political and historical reasons. 
However, the economic fragility of Jordan, combined with a strong 
and authoritarian political system should not be disregarded when it 
comes to assess the capacity of the Jordan society to cope with 
such a socio-economic shock. Moreover, the small country’s 
dimension of Lebanon is unfortunately offset by the enormous 
humanitarian needs it has to address. But E/MM fully concurs with 
the Evaluation on the key question of “where can Switzerland make 
a difference?” as a criteria for intervention. E/MM would however 
tend to privilege its “priority key” along modality lines (financial 
support, direct actions, secondments) rather than along 
geographical lines. For instance, SDC expertise in WASH or DRR 
enables to make a difference just by deploying a few Swiss 
technical experts within UN agencies. The thematic Swiss added 
value should not be neglected when it comes to assess the impact 
of Switzerland. Nevertheless, discussions concerning the future CS 
will include the question of choices to be made. 
R6 Support is to be provided for stabilising and improving 
livelihoods and for changing and stabilising fragile situations in a 
sustainable way, hence by facilitating transformational change. 
Fully sharing this analysis and convinced by the importance of a 
comprehensive (contiguum) approach, E/MM requested the SDC 
Directorate in June 2013 to be able to mobilize development funds 
for the region. In the absence of this opportunity, E/MM funds are 
limited to the Humanitarian budget. Nevertheless, E/MM always 
uses sustainability as a key criteria for selecting its interventions. 
Furthermore, E/MM favours the interventions of Global 
Programmes like GPMD (GPMD staff is based in the Amman 
regional office) and GPWI in the region. 
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R7 The “Whole Of Government Approach” is to guide Swiss 
analysis in a mid-term perspective; it is to prepare the ground for 
defining interventions and appropriate instruments in all phases: 
analysis, planning, implementation and monitoring. 
R8 The common analysis should allow each Swiss actor to remain 
true to their mandates and to the quality standards defined for their 
work. 
The next CS will be a WOGA / joint one. Starting with a profound 
common analysis becomes today a crucial tool for intervening in 
such a conflictive and fragile environment. Partly supporting this 
process, the Chatham House project on Syria will aim at 
developing and disseminating a better understanding of the impact 
the Syria crisis is having on the neighbouring countries. This 
initiative with a natural partner of AMON will hopefully feed into a 
joint analysis of the various Swiss administrative players. 
As stressed in this report, it is indeed essential to have a joint 
analysis as a common ground while respecting the respective 
mandates of the various Swiss actors. An alert mechanism should 
be considered when the mandate of one of the actors becomes 
jeopardized by the intervention another one. 
 
Evaluation Area 2: Relevance and appropriateness of project with regard to the Regional Strategy / Coherence of 
projects/programmes portfolio – Choices “What to do” 
 
Purpose: Appraise the coherence of the project portfolio with the CS and its relevance for achieving the country/domain objectives 
 
Recommendations to: Management Response 
2.1 Relevance of projects / programme portfolio  
R1 More focus to define the domains: For the next Regional 
Strategy, it is proposed to sharpen the focus of the chosen domains 
and eventually to reduce the number of domains of cooperation. 
Hence: 
- The next RP strategy could consist of the two domains “protection” 
and “basis services and livelihoods” – and each of them with a 
clearer focus allowing choices of partners and programs. 
- The current domain of intervention “Disaster Risk Reduction” 
should not be continued as a domain of its own. An exit strategy for 
this domain is to be prepared, targeting mainly the sustainability of 
investments made so far and “capitalising” Swiss visibility and good 
will. 
Currently, E/MM tends to think that protection should become a 
transversal theme rather than a domain, be it through a narrow 
definition of protection (Protection of Civilians) or through a 
broader understanding (protection as a rights based approach). 
There can be no doubt that this regional crisis has become today a 
severe protection crisis. It would therefore make sense to use 
protection as a transversal lens and ensure that all the projects / 
programmes clearly entail a protection objective. 
E/MM takes note of the recommendation to eliminate the DRR as 
a domain per se. Nevertheless, there have been major results 
achieved in this domain and SDC/Switzerland is highly 
appreciated for these interventions in Jordan and Lebanon. The 
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recommendation will be thoroughly discussed in the planning 
workshop. But to take it out from the new CS might be difficult 
considering that SDC has made DRR a spearhead of its 
institutional expertise and advocacy. 
R2 Few but bigger projects/programmes, strengthening of a 
programme approach: For giving the portfolio more focus, and for 
increasing the efficiency of the programme management, the following 
measures on project level are recommended: 
- Planning and realisation of projects with bigger financial volumes 
- Planning projects with a longer term horizon 
- When responding to crisis situation: checking the possibilities to 
reorient ongoing projects and invest additional financial and other 
resources in them. 
- More co-financing with other bilateral actors 
- Realise cross border projects, i.e. in the framework of the GP 
Water Initiative. 
E/MM agrees with these recommendations. Apart from efforts to 
be made to elaborate longer term humanitarian interventions 
(protracted crisis), we furthermore refer to the above mentioned 
issue on the humanitarian funds vs development funds. 
It is not clear what is meant by “More co-financing with other 
bilateral actors”. Regarding the direct actions, E/MM would tend to 
be careful with co-funding for two reasons. First, flagship projects 
become less interesting if co-funded. Second, the credibility of 
Switzerland as a neutral and impartial player in such a politicized 
environment requires careful selection of a funding partner. 
R3 The understanding of “Comprehensive Aid Approach - CAA” is 
to be further developed. It does not necessarily consist of combining 
Humanitarian Aid and “traditional development cooperation”. It can 
also combine HA and support to macroeconomic stabilisation, 
normative / regulatory systems (of service delivery to citizens, of 
governance, etc.) and peace building measures. CAA importantly 
consists of supporting transformational change of the situation (for 
instance by strengthening institutions and addressing refugees and 
host communities / local population). 
A “concept” which keeps on evolving in the UN world (renamed 
now a “Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework – CRSF), it 
however remains vague when facing the “how question”. Despite 
this current weakness, there is a large consensus in the IC on the 
need to mobilize development actors, instruments and funds in 
parallel to humanitarian tools for addressing a protracted crisis 
which not only destroys a state and its population but also 
dangerously threatens its neighbours with social, economic and 
political destabilization.  
Regarding the internal SDC point of view towards CAA , E/MM 
welcomes the suggestion made to explore the “middle space” 
between humanitarian and development tools, for instance by 
emphasizing and focusing on innovative conflict sensitive 
approaches. The “cash for hosting” project in Lebanon represents 
indeed an innovative approach which could inspire other actors. 
E/MM agrees that transformational change interventions should 
take place as soon as possible and in parallel with the 
humanitarian response. 
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R4 The humanitarian response itself needs improvement, e.g. 
optimisation of the management and delivery of the response, 
integrating reflections on sustainability on replication. 
We agree. The vacant position of the regional director in Amman 
combined with the unexpected additional CHF 20 mio to be spent 
in six months pushed the field and HQ under huge strain. This left 
little space for reflection on sustainability and replication of 
interventions and produced a huge HR turnover for the regional 
office (about one third of the staff left in 2013).  
R5 Financial volumes of the Swiss portfolio and the partner 
landscape do not permit to implement a fully regional approach. 
Nevertheless, the Swiss programme addresses regional issues 
regionally through UNRWA, and there seems to be a potential for 
enhanced work in the water sector. Shorter term activities should 
enhance to longer term objectives pursued with the respective 
partners (e.g. Syrian response by UNRWA) 
There are potential opportunities for more Swiss engagement on 
water issues. But WASH programmes are often high cost and mid-
term projects, two features which limit E/MM intervention through 
its humanitarian budget. The Jerash project in Jordan (in a 
Palestine refugee camp) as well as the UNRWA water project in 
Lebanon are among the most expensive projects of the portfolio. 
Both projects could only be funded thanks to the 0.5% money 
initiative and will end in 2014. “Niche” WASH projects in which 
Switzerland has a strong added value will be explored. 
2.2 Consistency of projects / programme objectives with the 
results framework of the domain  
R6 The coherence of SDC’s intervention with national and 
international efforts is very good. The position of SDC programmes 
and projects in the form of results framework and their monitoring 
based on such positioning provides the basis for coordinated and 
efficient use of resources and for reporting on effects of Swiss support. 
E/MM will make sure that this coherence remains a key priority for 
the new CS. 
R7 SDC’s support of multilateral agencies is well managed. SDC 
could increasingly use the coordinating role of multilateral 
organisations (UNDP, OCHA) when defining its interventions and 
contributions. Co-financing of activities with other bilateral donors 
could also be envisaged. Switzerland could also take a pro-active role 
in this field, in order to reduce transaction cost for partner 
governments. 
E/MM does not agree with this recommendation, except regarding 
UNRWA. Since the beginning of the crisis, E/MM was indeed very 
proactive in supporting the multilateral organizations (OCHA, 
UNHCR) in their coordination roles. It was also very active in the 
various multilateral fora and played an important role – both at the 
HQ and in the field – of a conveyor and a host for coordination 
initiatives. 
Furthermore, E/MM makes important efforts to mobilize other 
actors contributions (other Swiss actors like FOM, HSD and 
GPMD through the Protection in the Region platform, other donors 
like with the government of Liechtenstein). 
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2.3 Transversal themes at the level of the regional strategy and 
the domains  
R8 The number of transversal themes is to be reduced to what 
makes sense and can be implemented. This increases the chances 
that they can be fully taken up when planning and implementing 
projects and the programme as a whole. 
E/MM shares this analysis and will reduce them in its next CS. 
R9 Gender and DRR appear as good candidates to be maintained 
as transversal themes and to be applied best. The existing Credit 
Proposal’s check list could also be adapted to the needs of the region 
and the SCOs. 
E/MM shares this analysis, see also comments above. 
R10 Conflict sensitive project and programme management is to be 
made a mandatory approach (not a transversal theme), orienting all 
Swiss activities in the region. 
E/MM fully agrees with the “mandatory” nature of CSPM. Each 
intervention should be accountable for complying with this 
approach. This been said, a WOGA CS reinforces the importance 
and the need for the other Swiss actors to a) understand the 
Conflict Sensitive Approach (CSA) and b) integrate it in their 
interventions. Just like at the international level the development 
players progressively integrate the CSA (for instance the WB in 
Jordan), so shall the Swiss actors do. This will allow Switzerland to 
keep its very good acceptance and perception of a constructive 
and neutral player (honest broker) in the region. 
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Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the regional strategy and its portfolio – Choices “How to do it” 
 
Purpose: Appraise the efficiency of the portfolio management by the SCO and its contribution to an optimal achievement of results 
 
Recommendations to: Management Response 
3.1 Management Performance  
R1 Roles and responsibilities and lines of accountability among offices 
and people: need to be spelled out clearly for increased efficiency, 
effectiveness and smooth functioning. Discussions on strategic, 
institutional and personal aspects are not to be mixed. This especially 
applies in periods when important unplanned management tasks are to 
be realised – as is the response to the Syria crisis. Especially on short 
term projects, the cross-consultations in the office and between offices 
and HQ have to be minimised, allowing for quick decision making. 
E/MM agrees on the principle. In practice however, it is 
extremely difficult to find a balance between the needs for quick 
decision making on one side, and a coherent and coordinated 
regional response to a complex crisis on the other side. 
Moreover, if all three field offices (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey) 
face each different contexts, HQ adds a layer of complexity as, 
from a field perspective, it constitutes an unavoidable step for 
both sending political inputs/requests and briefing/advocating 
towards the political Heads of the FDFA. In such setting and 
with the close attention paid by the political Heads on this 
complex crisis, the transfer of competencies designed by the 
REO shows its limits. 
R2 Cooperation with single partners active throughout the region 
requires a coordinated approach to such actors. For instance, E/MM is to 
speak in one single voice with UNRWA (the lead being with the 
Jerusalem SCO) 
Better collaboration and coordination between SCOs in Amman 
and Jerusalem would be indeed desirable on the principle. 
Actually, E/MM tried to improve it but had to change several 
times the lead for the UNRWA file between these offices due to 
priorities to UNRWA itself (UNRWA having three headquarters – 
Amman, Jerusalem and Gaza). Since 2013, the SDC lead for 
the UNRWA file is with SCO Jerusalem. 
3.2 Quality of the monitoring system  
R3 SDC’s monitoring is to be organised more selectively and 
differentiated according to project type. It is acceptable to rely at least in 
parts, on the monitoring of multilateral partners, possibly contributing to it 
through secondments. 
The issue has been recognised. Therefore, the suggestion is 
well taken and welcomed. 
R4 The lessons learnt and other insights gained from the programme’s 
implementation are to be made more systematically available within 
E/MM shares this concern for improving the institutional learning 
but not the critique. E/MM used numerous and various spaces 
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E/MM and SDC as well as to other actors. to share its insights: the last two Annual conferences, numerous 
SDC reports, SDC newsletters, H-Info presentations, NGO 
symposium, events with the Conflict & Human Rights network, 
invitation of UNHCR to Bern for sharing its experience with the 
“beratende Kommission” just to name a few. As a current 
example, an evaluation of the “cash for hosting” project in 
Lebanon is ongoing, whose main objective is to capitalize and 
highlight the lessons learnt of this innovative project (knowledge 
management). E/MM will share the results within SDC and with 
others humanitarian actors. 
3.3 Coordination and aid effectiveness in the regional set-up  
R5 Coordination (in view of maximised aid effectiveness and a 
coherent presence of SDC within the region) is to start within SDC. The 
structures in the region and HQ are to communicate relevant information 
quickly and in appropriate ways. 
As written in the report and despite huge efforts by the field and 
by HQ, the flows of information within SDC are not “optimal”. 
The current regional set up is highly complex with a regional 
office covering five countries in a regional crisis consisting of 
different challenges. Nevertheless, E/MM believes until today 
that the regional set up is the most efficient solution in the given 
context. However, this issue will have to be discussed in the 
planning workshop for the future strategy. In addition to the 
above mentioned complexity of both the crisis and the 
institutional setting, the “Sonderfall” status of SDC office for the 
OPT is not included in the regional approach and therefore does 




Evaluation area 4: Results of the regional strategy – in relation to the results at the levels of countries and of the region – Choices 
“”What to achieve” 
 
Purpose: Appraise and compare the contribution of the Swiss Cooperation portfolio at the output and outcome level to the achievement of 
the development results of the partner country 
 
Recommendations to: Management Response 
4.1 Results and aid effectiveness / Swiss contribution to country 
(regional) results  
R1 Results at output level are to be interpreted so as to provide hints 
about the outcomes and even the impact of SDC interventions. As for 
monitoring, the assessment of the programme’s effectiveness is also to 
make use of supported (multilateral and other) organisation’s reporting 
on achievements. 
E/MM acknowledges this recommendation and notices some 
remaining confusions between outputs and outcomes in the AR 
2013. E/MM has mentioned this issue in its Management 
Response to the AR 2013. The regional SCO is constantly 
working on improving quality aspects of reporting mechanisms. 
4.2 Sustainability and scaling up  
R2 The sustainability of interventions is to be prepared mainly by 
capacitating local partners – both Government units and NGOs. This 
implies intensive cooperation with selected partners and the channelling 
of support through these actors whenever possible. 
E/MM fully agrees with this recommendation and is convinced 
that capacity building is key in long term development. It is 
already doing it, including in high emergency programmes such 
as its crossborder action. Working on a protracted crisis whose 
international funding is already seriously challenged, E/MM will 
put even more focus on this issue in the coming years. 
It has of course to be kept in mind that capacity building, 
supporting and empowering local partners are processes which 
require time and energy.  
R3 The scaling up of selected interventions (not all projects have 
respective potentials) is to be foreseen as early as the planning phase, 
and these projects are to actively prepare and promote the rolling-out of 
successful interventions (realised by SDC itself and/or by other actors). 
E/MM agrees with this recommendation. Several SDC projects 
have been scaled up and seen as good practice among donor 
community in the region. Nevertheless, space for improvement 
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Constituting one out of four peer review missions of a pilot program initiated by the SDC 
Controlling Division, two SDC staff, one Swiss and one locally recruited consultant 
evaluated the regional program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria between November 
16 and 25, 2013. The objective of the mission was to assess the strategic orientation, the 
operational steering and the achievements of the program. Based on this, it should 
express its views about the efficiency and effectiveness. The process of conducting the 
review and discussing the findings within SDC is designed to enhance SDC’s culture of 
institutional learning.  
Evaluation Objectives and Methodology 
Prior to visiting the field offices the review team delivered an inception report based on a 
document review and a total of six interviews in Berne. The interviews were conducted 
with line managers and other entities of the Department of Foreign Affairs involved in the 
Region as well as the former Regional Director. The delegation visited offices in Beirut 
and Amman, met the resident Swiss Ambassadors and embassy staff, held group 
briefings with all SDC staff in thematic sub-groups, and met with implementing partners, 
other donors and analysts. Field visits were possible to the Syrian border of the Bekaa 
Valley in Lebanon and two camps of Palestine refugees in Jordan. The review was also 
inspired by the findings of the external review of SDC instruments of working in fragile 
contexts and elements of the on-going process of adapting SDC instruments to working in 
fragile environments. 
Major Findings and Conclusions 
The review team was most impressed by the way the involved teams at HQ and in the 
Region and in particular the management prepared and accompanied the mission. 
Documents were easily available; staff was openly expressing views and expectations. 
Security was ably managed. This was all the more impressive as the teams are under 
stress from the implications of the Syrian crisis, the consequences of violence in Iraq and 
the risk of outbreaks of violent conflicts in all other countries. At the same time the 
operational and managerial challenges due to a high number of staff changes, increased 
availability of funds, restrictive conditions of host countries with respect to working with 
refugees and enhanced needs of coordination among Swiss actors and with donors 
added to the pressure. Management and local staff deal remarkably well with a very 
heavy workload and show strong commitment to the cause of relieving the suffering of 
refugees. They want to make a contribution to the stabilization of the region being aware 
that it is way beyond Swiss capacities to control the forces behind the problems. The 
relations between Embassies and SDC Offices are smooth, marked by mutual respect 
and a sense of solidarity reinforced by the difficult environment they are called upon to 
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operate. All findings should be seen in the light of the great recognition the review team 
wishes to express regarding the dedication and professionalism of the teams involved. 
Context Analysis: Joint understanding of Needs and Potentials 
The size and composition of the SDC offices in Lebanon and Jordan allows for a critical 
mass of exposure to different political and social groups in the host countries especially 
when combined with the respective networks of the Embassies. However, Switzerland has 
still a long way to go to live up to the requirements of what could be called a joint 
analytical understanding of the situation by all Swiss Government stakeholders and a joint 
approach to constantly adapting the understanding of the situation and discussing the 
operational, managerial and political implications. The reviewers found that the statement 
of the Evaluation “Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts” which reads “develop a clear common understanding of the transformation to be 
supported as the basis for discussions and reference point for developing objectives” fully 
applies to the issues the regional program IJSL is faced with. Switzerland needs to better 
understand where it can add value within the plethora of other international actors. The 
current set-up of the Task Force Middle East involves all the relevant actors but seems 
(from what the review could see) not to be able to provide clear guidance on how to read 
the context and on how to adapt action accordingly. Especially through their connections 
with multilateral and local partners, Field Offices and Embassies gather a wealth of 
knowledge which could be better exploited (see recommendation 1). The review team 
considers that the relative weakness of such context analysis has probably induced sub-
optimal choices at various levels. As an example the team believes that Switzerland could 
make a distinctive contribution to stabilization in Lebanon, where space and potential to 
innovate exist in a medium-term perspective, rather than in Jordan and Iraq, where 
massive foreign assistance already exists and, in the case of Jordan, where stability is 
relatively less at risk (although the humanitarian situation is also critical). Jordan will 
remain of critical importance in the coordination of the Syrian response. In Lebanon we 
see scope for a reinforced Swiss intervention, especially with innovative approaches to 
conflict sensitive interventions applied in a sustainability perspective. After reflection and 
identification of some valid entry points, we could see more financial and human 
resources allocated to Lebanon in the new strategy. The review team doesn’t see such 
potential for Switzerland to make a difference in Iraq. 
The review strongly recommends using scenario planning for the new strategy (foreseeing 
also differentiated reactions to scenarios) and to device a clear understanding of the 
concept for comprehensive development. The review team totally buys into the call for a 
comprehensive approach to the involvement in the Region as outlined in the draft UN 
strategy on the subject (“Towards a comprehensive regional strategy”, Draft 29.10.13). 
However, it considers that comprehensiveness in the context of middle income countries 
may be more of a combination of humanitarian tools and peace-building, macro-economic 
and normative instruments (the latter addressing regulatory levels of State interventions) 
than a traditional sequence of tools moving from prevention to emergency assistance and 
then to early recovery and development (often referred to as continuum/contiguum). 
Comprehensive development in that sense is strongly linked to political and macro-
economic dimensions. However, while strongly advocating for joint analysis of the context 
by all Swiss actors and close links to international partners, the review team also wants to 
stress the need for a consequent application of humanitarian principles, of principles of 
good humanitarian donorship and development cooperation. While Switzerland has to 
make its own choices on important issues, it is crucial for implementation to adhere to 
these principles (reflected also in the mandates of the FDFA units involved) of which 
impartiality in humanitarian work is among the most important ones. 
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Efficiency and Effectiveness of SDC action: How choices are made is decisive 
In the limited time available the review team came to the conclusion that both offices 
visited, for partly different reasons, can be compared to engines which run hot because of 
external (context related) and internal (organisational) stress factors. In fact, from various 
interviews we got the impression that the SDC engine in the region got rather too hot. This 
results in staff doubting it can live up to expectations (their own or others’) and in loss of 
confidence and hence efficiency. Easier said than done, the solution is to cool down the 
engine. This means to come to a situation where ambitious but reachable goals are 
formulated at all levels and the related resources are considered sufficient. To do this 
management and in fact all staff have to make choices at various levels. It is 
acknowledged that in the IJSL case higher level choices within FDFA and especially 
circumstances in the region were the main drivers of stress. However, even under these 
difficult circumstances, in a range of fields, other options could have been considered, e.g. 
in the choice of partner organizations, the size of projects to develop, the way of 
managing processes between offices and within offices and in the allocation of staff 
resources to tasks. Additionally, a more focused definition of domains of interventions 
could have allowed better strategic choices, more efficient allocation of human and 
financial resources, a sharpened Swiss profile, and ultimately increased effectiveness. 
The review team came to the conclusion that at least some of these choices could have 
been made differently with significant positive effects on staff satisfaction, workload and 
effectiveness. The review team also considers that in the current humanitarian response 
some interventions could work in a medium term perspective and take up more efficiently 
sustainability dimensions which are crucial in a situation of a protracted crisis. 
Implementation and Effectiveness – reach and measure results 
Despite the above-mentioned challenges, the Program is well under way. In all three 
domains of cooperation, SDC makes significant contributions to alleviate the suffering of 
target populations and for their protection. The program strengthens the capacities of 
partners, and, especially in Jordan, cooperation has resulted in the durable establishment 
of a system for Disaster Risk Reduction giving Switzerland high visibility and good will with 
the Jordanian Government.  
Yet, the mission came to the conclusion that many of the humanitarian projects with short 
duration and operation in hardly reachable locations are difficult to monitor at reasonable 
cost (follow-up on what is done). It is even more difficult to assess results and impacts. 
SDC instruments like Annual Reports (AR) must be adapted to this reality. The mission 
considers that indeed the AR is better adapted to development than to humanitarian 
contexts. The gap between the monitoring ambition and institutional requirements and the 
actual capacity for monitoring creates considerable frustration within SDC staff. Adapting 
tools could reduce pressure on them. 
The review team therefore considers that there is an institutional need to work on the 
understanding of monitoring in humanitarian contexts. Differentiated monitoring schemes 
are acceptable. Where SDC has the ambition to propose an innovative approach, 
monitoring must be more detailed and include the critical dimensions of the innovation in 
view of potential replication. For other activities, minimal monitoring should be acceptable. 
Secondments to multilateral partners seem to be an efficient and effective tool to enhance 
monitoring by these partners and may allow for exploration of Swiss contributions – if 
properly managed and followed up. Win-win situations for SDC and the partner 
organisation are realistic for monitoring of the context and results. We consider that SDC 
could add value to international coordination by orienting secondments on monitoring 
schemes of multilateral partners. For instance, we found the mapping of Syrian refugee 
presence in Lebanon combined with the poverty map of the host country to be a most 
useful instrument. It has value as a baseline for the cash for hosting project of SDC and is 
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at the same time used by multiple partners as a reference, including the Lebanese 
authorities. 
Main recommendations 
Under all circumstances the principles of good humanitarian donorship and standards of 
international development cooperation must be held up by Switzerland. 
1. Context analysis – political and strategic choices: The FDFA should use the 
considerable capital of trust and mutual understanding in its ranks to base its 
interventions in the wider region (Near East of West Asia) on a sound joint analysis. 
Updating periodically a dashboard-like instrument with relevant dimensions and 
developing scenarios based on the dashboard should be an option. Task Force 
meetings to update analysis and scenarios should have stringent facilitation to be 
efficient.  
 
2. Efficiency – Management choices: Management at all levels must seek to make 
choices which reduce stress especially for frontline staff, be it operational or 
administrative. Suggested lines of action: Use staff already in place before bringing in 
new persons; create tools which reduce administrative burdens in project 
management (e.g. “Globalkredite”, work with known partners before identifying new 
ones, use the space for interpretation of higher level instructions, reduce levels of 
cross-consultations within the office (e.g. of credit proposals); consequently centralize 
or decentralise administrative project management. At the program level the following 
could help: More focused definition of the domains of intervention (e.g. wash for basic 
services) and reduction of the number of transversal themes. 
 
3. Effectiveness – reach and measure results. The Domain Humanitarian Aid 
and the Quality Assurance network should come up with a suggestion on how to 
deal with results monitoring and evaluation in a humanitarian context. It is often 
justified to resort to the overall international monitoring of a situation (e.g. the 
number of refugee children attending school) and just conclude by deduction that 
SDC through respective projects has made a plausible contribution to this. When 
a crisis situation is likely to be protracted, project design could be for a longer 
period and include a framework of results monitoring. The use of the framework 
could then be conditioned to the protracted situation. Buying into and influencing 






1.1 Objectives of the Regional Strategy Evaluation 
The overall goal of the country and regional strategy evaluations is to enhance the 
coherence of Swiss development cooperation and humanitarian aid in regard to national 
development priorities or partner priorities and the Federal Council Dispatch, and to 
provide a basis for SDC’s management for strategic and operational steering in order to 
enhance development results and/or respectively improve humanitarian response in 
emergency situations / fragile contexts. 
The objectives of the evaluation realised in the IJSL region (one of four pilots, organised 
by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division in view of introducing a standardised 
procedure for peer evaluations) are (i) to assess, through a mutual learning process 
whether SDC with its partners is reaching the strategic objectives defined in the Regional 
Cooperation Strategy, and how efficient the strategic and operational steering 
mechanisms of the Cooperation Office are; (ii) to assess to what extent the Swiss 
contribution is making a significant contribution to the national development results and to 
humanitarian efforts, and to identify the key factors, which foster or hinder aid 
performance and results achievements; (iii) to identify good practices and innovative 
approaches, and share experiences, in managing the RS; (iv) to build the basis for 
defining the key parameters of subsequent Regional Strategies. This last objective was 
highlighted by the Program’s management, since a new process of strategic reflection will 
be realised in 2014, defining the new medium term orientation of the Swiss presence in 
the region. 
 
1.2 Methods and Structure of the Report 
The present evaluation report is structured according to the provisions of the Corporate 
Controlling Section’s concept for country strategy evaluations, touching upon four 
evaluation areas (context analysis; relevance, implementation, results), for which specific 
evaluation questions were identified (see appendix 1). The evaluation process, realised by 
two SDC staff, the peers, an international and a local consultant, consisted of the three 
following major steps: 
Preparation Phase 
The Swiss members of the evaluation team, in October and November, 2013 read the 
very well prepared background documents provided by the EMM Division; and they 
carried out interviews with representatives of the Swiss Federal Administration (SDC, 
PD/HSD, PD/AMON) who are involved in the Regional Program’s management or whose 
activities outside the SDC Program touch the region. The preparatory phase resulted in 
the drafting of an Inception Report that, amongst other, proposed working hypotheses on 
which the further evaluation process built. The comments of stakeholders of the Swiss 
presence in the region on the Inception Report additionally alimented the evaluation 
process. 
Field Mission in Lebanon and Jordan (16-26 November, 2013) 
The mission to the region, realised in Jordan with a local colleague, allowed for gathering 
additional information – through meetings with the staff of the SDC offices in Amman and 
in Beirut, visits to SDC partners representing Governments, Multilateral Organisations and 
International NGOs, and through visiting project sites. A debriefing meeting with the team 
of the Amman Office on November 26, 2013, permitted to test preliminary findings and 




The present draft report summarises the evaluation results and makes recommendations 
that, ideally, contribute to the EMM Division’s reflections on the next Regional Cooperation 
Strategy. Comments to the draft report by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling and 
the EMM Divisions will provide the basis for the establishment of a finalised evaluation 
report. 
 
1.3 Overview of the Regional Cooperation Strategy Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon 
and Syria 2010-2014 
The Program “Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria” (RP 
IJLS) has two main specificities: It is a regional 
Program, covering four countries (even five if the 
interventions in Turkey reacting to the Syria crisis are 
considered), and its thrust is mainly humanitarian 
(with the ambition, to implement a comprehensive aid 
approach (CAA)). The Swiss Program in Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria is motivated and driven by the 
large number of refugees in the region (almost 5 
million Palestinians, more than 2 million Syrians, an 
estimated 2 million Iraqis) living in several countries. 
Chances are that the number of refugees and IDPs will 
continue to increase in the next months and years. 
Switzerland’s current cooperation with Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria is mainly a humanitarian 
Program. Other target groups consist of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and labour migrants mainly. 
The dominant factor for Program development in the 
past two years has been and continues to be the 
Syrian civil war which, since 2011, has taken over 
120,000 lives according to the UK based NGO Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights. The Swiss response to 
this crisis has co-determined many aspects of the 
Program, leading to the mobilisation of additional funds 
(i.e. 20 Mio. CHF in June 2013), to the planning and 
implementation of additional projects, and even to the 
realisation of activities in Turkey, a fifth country 
covered by the regional Program. The Syria crisis adds 
Palestine Refugees in the Region 
(Registered in UNRWA - 2010 figures) 
in Gaza 1,167,361 
in the West Bank 848,494 
in Jordan 1,999,466 
in Syria 495,970 





Iraqi Refugees in the Region 
(2009 figures) 
in Syria 1.2 – 1.4 million 
in Jordan 0.5 – 06. million 
in Lebanon 20,000 – 30,000 





Syrian Refugees in the Region 
(November 2013 figures) 
in Lebanon 831,457 
in Jordan 560,059 
in Turkey 522,111 
in Iraq 208,054 
in Egypt 128,158 
Subtotal 2,249,839 
North Africa 17,139 
Total 2,266,978 
IDPs in Syria over 6,500,000 
Sources: UNHCR for refugees: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
IDMC for IDPs 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria 
Regional Program for Iraq, Jordan, 
















CSPM, Gender Equality,Climate Change 
Neutrality/Adaptation,  Disaster Resilience  
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to the region’s complex and complicated situation, which is at the crossroads of global 





2. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Choices are to be made for Switzerland’s future cooperation with the region; 
choices to increase the Swiss interventions’ effectiveness and profile and ultimately their 
impact on the ground. These choices concern both the strategic level (choice of partner 
countries, selection and concise definition of domains of intervention, relative importance 
of different cooperation modalities) and operational aspects (amongst other: selection of 
implementing partners, SDC structures in the region and respective financial and human 
resources, monitoring instruments, coordination). The upcoming definition of a next 
Cooperation Strategy with the region provides an excellent opportunity for preparing and 
applying respective choices. 
The following paragraphs provide analyses and recommendations which are meant to 
allow the RP’s management to prepare respective choices – both in the short term and in 
view of the definition of a new Regional Cooperation Strategy. 
 
Evaluation Area 1: Context Analysis – Choices “How to Adapt” 
1.1 Positioning and Adaption of the Strategy with respect to the Countries’ and 
Regional Contexts and Swiss Policies 
The context in which the RP IJLS is being implemented is extremely fragile – both in 
single countries (to a lesser extent in Jordan) and in the region. Unrest, security problems 
and armed conflicts in one country affect severely its neighbours. Thorough analysis of 
context and diligent subsequent selection of interventions which are to target both the 
alleviation of suffering and the change of the fragile situations are therefore crucial for the 
quality of the Program’s implementation. 
 
Conclusions 
- Switzerland reacted quickly to the Syria crisis and met the needs of refugees (and the 
hosting communities); however different Swiss actors (SDC, FDFA’s PD/Human 
Security Directorate) reacted rather in their respective institutional logic. Coordination 
was often sub-optimal.  
 
- The SDC response to the Syria crisis consists of a big number of diversified projects, 
adding importantly to the management tasks of the pre-existing cooperation Program 
and its already important number of projects. 
 
- The reaction to the crisis is partly regional (support to UNRWA, 20 Mio. CHF made 
available for responding to the Syrian crisis), but articulated mainly at national levels 
(Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). 
 
- The conditions attached to the additional 20 million CHF for responding to the Syria 
crisis, as understood by the evaluation team, were not conducive to efficient 
identification of projects. Having to commit and disburse funds by the end of 2013 
constrained the quality of the Program’s implementation 
 
Recommendations 
- At SDC HQ, conditions for swift reaction to exceptional situations, which are likely to be 
protracted, should be revised. Expanding existing activities with known partners, fewer 
projects with higher financial volumes and in-built longer term goals are options to be 
emphasized. 
 
- In complex situations requiring urgent responses, choices for allocating financial and 




- Medium term scenarios of the evolution in the region and in single countries are to be 
developed for the planning of future Swiss interventions, helping to define and quickly 
adapt respective “weighting” of Swiss interventions (intervention areas, modalities, 
choice of partners). They provide a sound basis for Task Force discussions and 
decisions. 
 
The Syria Crisis 
Switzerland’s Response 
Switzerland’s quick reaction to the unfolding and the full outbreak of the Syrian crisis 
responded mainly to the needs of (displaced) groups in Syria and of the refugees who fled 
to neighbouring countries (food, housing, education, health, and cash). Funds are 
channeled through contributions to humanitarian partners (some of the active within 
Syria), the implementation of own projects (also through cross-border cooperation), 
deployment of technical experts to UN agencies and support to international coordination 
and humanitarian dialogue. Additional human resources (SKH staff) were mobilised to 
manage the programme and to implement, for instance, together with a local partner 
organisation, a “cash for hosting families” project in Lebanon. An additional person is 
positioned in Turkey, where Switzerland also contributes to international efforts in 
response to the Syria crisis. 
So far (November, 2013) 30 
projects have been or are being 
realised in reaction to the Syrian 
crisis (some of them during 
longer than one year, the 
projects in the graph can 
therefore not be summed up). 
The financial volume of the 
support amounted to more than 
40 Mio CHF (including the 20 
Mio CHF announced by the 
Federal Council in June 2013) in 
September, 2013. By the end of 
2013, SDC has allocated 55 Mio 
CHF to the Syria crisis. All SDC 
projects were attributed either to the RP’s domain “Basic Services and Livelihoods” (BSL) 
or “Protection”. 
The allocation of funds for SDC’s activities reacting to the Syria crisis was done both at 
Headquarters (HQ) and in the region. While HQ identified the ways of cooperating with 
multilateral organisations that have continued presence in Syria and for providing 
refugees arriving in Turkey, the offices in Amman and Beirut identified possibilities to 
intervene in favour of victims of the Syrian civil war in the two countries and in Iraq as well 
as of hosting communities, and in Syria itself, targeting IDPs and isolated communities 
(the Swiss Embassy and the SCO being closed at the end of February, 2012). SDC 
funded projects reached beneficiaries in Syria through chains of cooperation, resulting 
also in capacity building for the actors involved in the chains. The HSD also funded 
projects in Syria, targeting the strengthening of the country’s civil society. 
Do No Harm 
In emergency situations, the support of populations in need is a priority for humanitarian 
interventions. Tensions arising from such situations are to be avoided; a Conflict Sensitive 
Project and Program Management must be systematically applied. SDC’s reactions to the 


















Response to the Syria Crisis: 
Financial Volume and 
Numbers of Projects per Year 
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Syria crisis have been much aware of these tensions. “Do no harm” in this region means 
support to the refugees as well as to the local population; both types of support have to be 
designed in conflict sensitive manner and with clear criteria. Interventions should not do 
harm – as the hosting communities could consider the help provided mainly to the 
refugees as unjust, since they themselves face difficulties. Issues can also arise among 
beneficiaries of support, if access to services provided is considered to be unequal. 
Moreover, it has to be noted that the refugees are located in poorer areas of Lebanon and 
Jordan (based on UNCHR poverty/refugees maps). Tensions between the host societies 
– in Palestine Refugee camps, around camps recently established for Syrian refugees in 
Jordan, and in the Middle East at large – do exist. They chiefly concern three areas: the 
labour market, Syrian workers being prepared to work for lower salaries than local 
workers or migrant workers from other countries, the housing market, where rents are said 
to have increased in some densely inhabited Syrian refugee areas, and the pressure on 
host country education systems and water resources. Host society grievances against 
Syrian refugees per se are growing as the number of Syrian refugees continues to 
increase daily and conflicts tend to increase over time. 
The Pre-Existing Program 
Simultaneously to the Syrian response program, SDC’s pre-existing Program, targeting to 
a large extent the Palestine refugees in the region, has continued to be implemented. 
Some of the pre-existing projects are affected by the Syrian refugee crisis (the SDC 
supported UNRWA has had to face and adapt to the arrival of more than 50,000 Palestine 
refugees from Syria in Lebanon, many of them now residing in Palestine refugee camps 
and other overcrowded localities, thus adding to the promiscuity and its consequences. 
Other pre-existing projects were less affected by the Syria crisis and are being carried out 
as planned (e.g. the support to Jordan’s disaster preparedness which, so far, deals mainly 
with natural disaster risks). The equation appears obvious: many pre-existing projects + 
many new projects = too many projects for the existing structures in place. 
 
1.2 Quality of Context Analysis 
The region is probably the number one spot world-wide when it comes to the need for a 
comprehensive context assessment (political, military, social, economic, and ecological), 
providing a sound basis for strategic and operational choices for interventions. While 
single Swiss actors did analyse the Syria crisis and the situations resulting from it in 




- The possibility of a major crisis in Syria was not foreseen as a realistic scenario (by 
SDC in its Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014 and other relevant actors, including 
multilateral organisations). Reactions to the crisis were therefore mostly ad hoc. 
Coordination took quite a long time to be put in place. 
 
- The context analysis performed after the Syria crisis had emerged was strongly driven 
by the immediate humanitarian impact of this crisis and rather hasty assessment of 
political opportunities and less by a systematic, integrated approach to reading the 
situation in the region. 
 
Recommendations 
- The new Cooperation Strategy for the region is to be drafted in 2014, based on a joint 
analysis of Swiss stakeholders and on scenarios. 
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- Given the high probability of a protracted crisis, choices have to be made regarding the 
selection of partner countries, the definition of the domains and target groups, and the 
financial volume and types of cooperation with them as well as the instruments used. 
Lebanon appears to be the one country in the region where Switzerland can make a 
difference: positive results and impact are potentially big, because of the country’s 
dimensions, increased fragility and local needs. 
 
- Support is to be provided for stabilising and improving livelihoods and for changing and 
stabilizing fragile situations in a sustainable way, hence by facilitating transformational 
change. 
 
- The “whole of Government approach” is to guide Swiss analysis in a mid-term 
perspective; it is to prepare the ground for defining interventions and appropriate 
instruments in all phases: analysis, planning, implementation, and monitoring. 
 
- The common analysis should allow each Swiss actor to remain true to their mandates 
and to the quality standards defined for their work. 
Analysis of the Context 
SDC’s Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014 for the Region addresses the main dimensions of 
the region’s and the countries’ needs and dynamics: The countries covered by the 
strategy are middle income countries affected by specific social and economic 
inequalities; the political and demographic situations are complex, and the “threat of war 
and potential regional spill-over” as well as the possibility that Syria’s fragile political 
balance be affected by a worsening socio-economic situation are explicitly stated by the 
CS. But, as other observers and actors of the region, it did not foresee the possibility of a 
civil war in Syria. Rather, it oriented its plans on a “most likely scenario”, characterised by 
coping deficiencies of host countries’ deficiencies in managing refugee situations, the 
possibilities of erupting violence in the West Bank and Gaza and military confrontation 
between Israel and its neighbours as well as droughts affecting the region with their socio-
economic consequences. It can be concluded that the strategy is currently outdated and 
needs renewed analysis and adaptation starting in 2014. 
Context Analysis and Program Implementation and WOGA 
The rapid deterioration of the Syrian crisis required a fast identification of projects amidst 
repeated international fund raising calls. This put limits to the analyses of Swiss actors 
involved (SDC and PD/HSD) and to their coordination. The foremost important issues in 
such situations is the “do no harm principle”. It is very easy to fall into the trap of partiality 
and lose out on freedom of action both in humanitarian terms (access to people in need 
on all sides) and from a development policy perspective (loss of confidence of main 
players for reconstruction and policy dialogue). Ideally, joint and consensual analyses of 
the Swiss actors involved, conducted during a workshop, for instance, would have 
provided the basis for a shared understanding of the appropriate reaction (when 
supporting target groups in Syria especially), and it would have allowed for more efficient 
implementation of support. (With the Working Group Middle East (AGNO) and the 
Interdepartmental Working Group Syria-Lebanon, Swiss actors had the instrument to 
realise such joint analyses.) Also, and despite the emergency situation, the time horizon of 
analysis ought to have allowed for medium term planning of interventions – both at 
strategic level and at the level of single projects. This would have further increased the 
coherence, and strengthened the quality of Swiss interventions in term of risk awareness 




Efficient and effective implementation of coordinated interventions of Swiss actors 
(WOGA) requires ongoing contacts between them. During future analytical work and 
planning (which is to be done in a medium term perspective, and based on scenarios), 
these contacts are to be especially close, both at HQ and on the ground, and are to result 
in a jointly drafted document which demonstrates the shared understanding and the 
willingness for coordinated interventions. 
In the medium term perspective of the integration of Cooperation Offices into Embassies, 
it is of utmost importance that SDC continues to operate according to internationally 
agreed quality standards. On the ground, coordination of actions in fragile and conflict 
affected contexts is crucial. 
From Context Analysis to Strategic Choices: Where to be active and how? 
Switzerland needs to better understand where it can add value within the plethora of other 
international actors. What will be Switzerland’s unique contribution to the stabilisation and 
development and humanitarian response in the region? 
One choice to be made for the future SDC strategy in the region concerns the countries of 
intervention and their relative importance. The following table proposes an instrument for 
respective decision making (the list of criteria is not exhaustive) providing a possible 
rationale for interventions. This table should be then combined with the scenarios to 
determine the relative weights of the Swiss presence. The presentation below is a 

















interests … Country/Region 
↓ 
Lebanon big big big Yes Big big  
Jordan Small big moderate No Big moderate  
Iraq Big big 
big 
in the long 
term 
No Small potentially big  
Syria Big big uncertain No small 
in the short term 
moderate  
Region Big big big No 
(except UNRWA) 




Mutually reinforcing actions of 
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Medium   Term 
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Lebanon: Switzerland can contribute to reach the best case scenario, i.e. “absence of 
war”. The country needs support, it suffers from an “absence” of Government, 
aid is much politicized (i.e. Hezbollah is a constraining factor). There is space 
for Swiss interventions, but the unstable situation contains risks. Switzerland 
can make a difference in Lebanon and innovate when defining, for instance, 
unique contributions to host communities of refugees in the medium-term. 
Support is to be provided in line with the WB/UNDP Stabilization Road Map 
and making use of Switzerland’s comparative advantages. 
Jordan: The rationale for Swiss interventions is weaker. In responding to the Syria 
crisis, Jordan, unofficially, controls the influx of Syrian refugees, allowing not 
more than 300 persons per day to enter the country. In response to the Syria 
crisis, two refugee camps were already opened; a third camp is ready, but it 
has not opened yet, as there are apparently not enough refugees to use it. 
There are lesser tensions between the local population and Syrian refugees 
than in Lebanon. In addition, the Government has set a rule the 30% of the 
beneficiaries of response to the Syrian crisis in Jordan are to be Jordanians 
(while 70% can be Syrian refugees). This mechanism carries a good potential 
to diminish tension between the resident population and refugees. Switzerland 
could be support the definition of criteria for the allocation of external support 
to different target groups and coordinate this conflict sensitive action. The role 
of Jordan as a pivotal country for the Syrian response (regional hub) and the 
positioning of SDC’s Regional Office are not questioned by these reflections. 
 Jordan’s development problems are located at three levels: 1) problems 
already existing before the Syrian crisis, 2) problems amplified by the crisis, 
and 3) new problems arising as a result of the crisis. The rationale for a Swiss 
intervention in Jordan’s development could be justified only for the second and 
third levels. But Switzerland’s comparative advantages for a longer term 
classic development intervention are difficult to identify in an almost 
overcrowded support environment. 
Iraq: A choice is to be made between stopping (the already very limited) 
cooperation (or reducing it to the Embassy’s small actions) and a full-fledged 
intervention. For the latter, not enough resources are available, the conditions 
for cooperation are extremely arduous (except for the country’s northern parts, 
i.e. Kurdistan), and reaching impact and making a difference is quite difficult or 
not achievable for Switzerland. 
Syria: In the short term, support to the populations affected by the civil war is to be 
continued. In the medium-term, reconstruction (of infrastructure, of society, of 
the State) will be a task to which Swiss actors should contribute selectively 
(e.g. in the water sector, and obviously based on thorough analysis). The 
mission was not able to evaluate the role of Switzerland in the peace process 
for Syria. If Switzerland is decided to contribute to peace building adequate 
resources must be made available through the respective channels. In most 
cases it is better not to link humanitarian action directly with political 
negotiations, but to assure overall coherence of Swiss intervention.  
Region: The regional level can be addressed through actors active regionally (e.g. 
UNRWA), and by supporting projects that target the region. The Global 
Programs (Water/Blue peace and Migration) could be better exploited if the 
respective potential is demonstrated. The Blue Peace program may need to 
be better integrated at the local level and in the Regional strategy. It has to be 
noted that the Global Programme Migration uses another definition of region.  
Interventions should be planned where fragility is high, where the potentials for 
development in a 20 years horizon exist, and where Switzerland has an interest in and 
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can make a difference in participating in the stabilisation efforts of partners – representing 
both the countries themselves and international actors (multilateral organisations, INGOs). 
 
Evaluation Area 2: Relevance and Appropriateness of Projects with regards 
to the Regional Strategy / Coherence of Project / Program Portfolio – 
Choices “What to Do” 
 
2.1 Relevance of the Projects / Program Portfolio 
SDC’s Regional Program in the Near East is basically humanitarian – its initial logic was a 
humanitarian one and its funding is from the humanitarian budget – even though EMM 
representatives highlighted the fact that many of them are “development driven”, targeting 
also durable change of organisations and enhancement of their capacities. In 2010, 
development projects (addressing “Governance” and “Environment”) were phased out. 
Currently three domains and four implementation modalities characterise the regional 
Program’s portfolio. The “Basic Services and Livelihoods” domain and the multilateral 
channel modality absorb the most important part of the Program’s budget. 
Domains (according to CS) Implementation Modalities (according to 
CS) 
• Basic Services and Livelihoods: 72% of 
financial means 
• Protection: 14% of financial means 
• Disaster Risk Reduction: 14% of 
financial means 
• Multilateral: 67% of financial means  
• Bilateral: 17% of financial means 
• Secondments: 10% of financial means 




- The mainly humanitarian Program consists of well over 100 projects and targets mainly 
(Palestine, Iraqi, Syrian) refugees and other migrant populations (IDPs, labour 
migrants). 
 
- The largest number of projects are realised with costs less than 1 Mio Swiss Francs, 
and an overwhelming majority are funded with less than 200,000 Francs. This results in 
a scattered and “unmanageable” and “unmonitorable” portfolio. 
- The regional approach mainly consists in the fact that the Program is active in four 
(five) countries and that the Palestine refugees – a focal target group, supported mainly 
through UNRWA – are present in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (and the oPt). The Syria 
crisis added a regional dimension, but was not exploited clearly as an opportunity to 
strengthen the response’s regional character. 
 
- So far there is not a clear added value for increased effectiveness due to the Program’s 
regional dimensions. There is need to define better what the regional approach 
consists of, i.e.: 1) target groups; 2) partners – additional coordination needed (e.g. 
UNRWA / lead Jerusalem), 3) approaches – as of now: rather national responses 
adapted to country context. 
 
Recommendations 
- More focus to define the domains: For the next Regional Strategy, it is proposed to 
sharpen the focus of the chosen domains and eventually to reduce the number of 
domains of cooperation. hence: 
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o The next RP could consist of the two domains “protection” and “Basic Services and 
Livelihoods” – and each of them with a clearer focus allowing choices of partners 
and Programs 
o The current domain of cooperation “Disaster Risk Reduction” should not be 
continued as a domain of its own. An exit strategy for this domain is to be 
prepared, targeting mainly the sustainability of investments made so far and 
“capitalising” Swiss visibility and good will.  
 
- Fewer but bigger projects/programs, strengthening of a program approach: For giving 
the portfolio more focus, and for increasing the efficiency of the Program’s 
management, the following measures on project level are recommended: 
o planning and realisation of projects with bigger financial volumes 
o planning projects with a longer time horizon 
o when responding to crisis situation: checking the possibilities to reorient ongoing 
projects and invest additional financial and other resources in them. 
o more co-financing with other bilateral actors 
o realise cross boarder projects, i.e. in the framework of the GP Water Initiatives. 
 
- The understanding of “Comprehensive Aid Approach” is to be further developed. It 
does not necessarily consist of combining Humanitarian Aid and “traditional 
development cooperation”. It can also combine HA and support to macroeconomic 
stabilisation, normative / regulatory systems (of service delivery to citizens, of 
governance, etc.) and peace building measures. CAA importantly consists of 
supporting transformational change of the situation (for instance by strengthening 
institutions and addressing refugees and hosting communities/local population). 
- The humanitarian response itself needs improvement, e.g. optimisation of the 
management and delivery of the response, integrating reflections on sustainability and 
replication. 
- Financial volumes of the Swiss portfolio and the partner landscape do not permit to 
implement a fully regional approach. Nevertheless, the Swiss Program addresses 
regional issues regionally through UNRWA, and there seems to be a potential for 
enhanced work in the water sector. Shorter term activities should enhance to longer 
term objectives pursued with the respective partners (e.g. Syrian response by UNRWA) 
 
Assessment of the Portfolio 
The initial financial planning (realised in 2010) was 
overthrown due to the Syria crisis. Financial means were 
more than doubled compared to original plans, and the 
number of projects was increased by about 25% (30 
additional projects responding to the Syria crisis). 
Given the institutional setting and SDC rules, and the 
imperative to respond rapidly to the unfolding Syrian crisis, it 
was difficult for the Regional Program IJSL to reduce the 
number of projects. The issue was taken up in successive 
Office Management Reports. The set-up of the Program with 
a regional office and two sub-offices (currently: one) 
constitute an additional difficulty. While important means for 
reacting to the Syria crisis were channelled through 
multilateral organisations, the Swiss response was and is being articulated specifically in 
the neighbouring countries, i.e. Jordan and Lebanon, and recently Turkey, where one 
additional staff is to be out posted early in 2014. This allows for responding to the specific 
situations and needs of the refugees in these countries, and those of the host societies 
that are – at least in part – also targeted by the Swiss interventions. 
  
Initial Financial Planning 
and Actual Budget 2013 




BSL 16.0 38.0 
PRO 3.0 13.5 
DRR 3.5 1.5 
Offices and 
others 3.0 3.1 
Total 25.5 56.1 
Sources: CS and AR 2013 
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The Domains of Cooperation 
In the two domains “Basic Services and Livelihoods” and “Protection” quite different types 
of projects can be and are grouped (result: “all inside”). This allows for flexibility in the 
selection of projects. But encompassing domains may entail lack of focus, thus affecting 
the effectiveness of interventions and the program’s profile. The broadly described 
domains don’t allow for strategic choices. According to Program managers interviewed, 
“Protection” especially is not focused enough; some would prefer to put “protection” as a 
transversal theme. Both these domains have to be defined with clearer foci. For instance, 
they can target populations more specifically defined or subsectors more precisely 
described (e.g. Wash); types of intervention can be sharpened by a selection of 
instruments to be applied. Other means to give the two domains clearer foci consist in 
area-based interventions, in the definition of selected geographical areas on which 
Switzerland intervenes within partner countries, and/or of levels of intervention (central - 
local). 
The “Disaster Risk Reduction” 
(DRR) domain allowed for 
relevant results with compara-
bly small investments, even 
though they entail important 
efforts of the Program staff. 
Since the domain has shown 
excellent results in Jordan, 
where the Jordan Search & 
Rescue Team was INSARAG 
classified, it now appears to 
be the right time to prepare 
the phasing out of the domain 
and, for a limited period of ti-
me, to concentrate on the su-
stainability of supported part-
ners. If in Lebanon, the sup-
port for disaster risk reduction 
continues, is to accompany 
the elaboration of the law ba-
sed on the approved national action plan and possibly the monitoring of its 
implementation. 
Number of Projects 
The reduction of the number of projects – a necessity for various reasons, including the 
Program’s profile and its effectiveness, the efficiency of Program management 
(administration, monitoring and reporting above all) – can be achieved by choosing more 
programmatic approaches, by designing projects absorbing larger sums, longer project 
phases (e.g. three year phases, possibly with foreseen “breaking points” when an activity 
can be terminated if not satisfactory or no more required, grouping projects under 
umbrella / Globalkredit modality). A more programmatic approach 
In the future, response to crisis may not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of 
projects, there may be possibilities to provide aid through ongoing, expanded projects – 
without deviating the projects’ purposes and without forcing implementing partners to 
realise activities that are outside their own strategic orientation and capacities, obviously. 
Regional Approach 
The regional character of the Program – resulting mainly from the fact that the program is 
active in more than one country, the regional impact of crises (refugees), and the support 
to partners active regionally (UNRWA) – can be strengthened in order to legitimate 
Possible Domains Orienting SDC Activities in the Next 
Strategic Phase of Cooperation with the Region 
 
Basic Services & Livelihoods 
 
Strategy 
Program approach with a clear 
focus on specific topics and / or 















Program approach with a clear 
focus on specific topics and / or 













Switzerland’s regional presence. While a future Program is to give leeway for projects to 
react to specific problems in the partner countries, it is also to reinforce its regional scope 
by addressing regional problems regionally. This is obviously not an easy task, since the 
Syria crisis has accentuated the vulnerability of the states in the region, thus making it 
more difficult to unite them around common initiatives and interventions. Still, the Global 
Programs “Water Initiatives” (which carries potential for WOGA and for the application of a 
regional approach) and “Migration and Development” clearly have the potential for 
enhancing the regional character of SDC’s cooperation (although the GP Migration and 
Development rather targets the Gulf region and is not closely linked to the IJLS region). 
For this to happen, the interaction between EMM and the two Global Programs and the 
Embassies are to be intensified. EMM is also to explore possibilities to identify new 
projects which are designed as “regional” from the start. 
The regional character of SDC’s intervention also consists of its coordination with EMM’s 
activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In this respect, common multilateral 
partners – mainly UNRWA – are to be addressed and supported in coherent and 
coordinated ways, at SDC HQ, regional and national levels, so as not to give room for 
misunderstandings and contradictory messages from different Swiss actors. 
Comprehensive Aid Approach 
EMM is the result of the merging of a Humanitarian Aid and a Development Cooperation 
section, it has been established as a unit that is to explore and pilot possibilities of 
implementing CAA. The comprehensiveness of the aid approach, so far, has mainly been 
an implicit one. A more explicit version of CAA will, amongst other things, allow SDC 
support for fully being in line with the BUSAN principle of “act fast but stay engaged”. The 
planning of the next strategic phase of the regional cooperation is to develop a more 
specific understanding of CAA and its concrete implementation in the region. This applies 
both on a regional level and for single partner countries. Comprehensiveness of aid is to 
include activities targeting the transformation of the context they are active in in view of 
stabilisation and its conduciveness to development. 
At the regional level, the comprehensiveness of aid approach is to be increased, including 
through the further strengthening of the capacities of regional actors (e.g. UNRWA) to 
contribute to the development (the livelihood improvement) of their target groups within 
the host societies, and thus to the development of the region overall. 
Regarding the partner countries, the comprehensiveness of the Swiss aid is to be defined 
by positioning it between the countries’ needs for humanitarian aid (and the respective 
support already received) and their development potentials (including the national 
planning and the support provided by third parties). Once this position is found, 
appropriate instruments are to be selected, and cooperation partners are to be identified. 
This, together with increased foci defined for the domains of cooperation, will in-crease 




















2.2 Consistency of Projects / Program Objectives with the Results Framework of 
the Domain 
Since 2011, the issue of the Program’s and of single projects’ consistency with results 
frameworks was side-lined by the Syrian crisis and the resulting emergency situation in 
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- In the absence of national strategies for many efforts provided by the SDC Program in 
the partner countries, reporting asses coherence, at least in parts, against the 
strategies of relevant (humanitarian) actors (UNRWA, UNHCR, UNDP, ICRC). 
 
Recommendations 
- The coherence of SDC’s interventions with national and international efforts is very 
good. The positioning of SDC Programs and projects in the form of Results Framework 
and their monitoring based on such positioning provides the basis for coordinated and 
efficient use of resources and for reporting on effects of Swiss support. 
 
- SDC’s support of multilateral agencies is well managed. SDC could increasingly use 
the coordinating role of multilateral organisations (UNDP, OCHA) when defining its 
interventions and contributions. Co-financing of activities with other bilateral donors 
could also be envisaged. Switzerland could also take a pro-active role in this field, in 
order to reduce transaction cost for partner Governments. 
 
While the Results Framework of the Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014 does not make 
extensive reference to national and sector strategies of the partner countries, or to 
overarching strategies of multilateral actors, the AR do establish such links. They measure 
outcomes achieved in domains against regional and national Programs and “country 
development results” – or state that country development results are not defined. 
SDC does not simply channel funds through multilateral agencies, but is in discussion with 
these organisations and, in the framework of its possibilities, follows their activities. The 
information obtained during these contacts has an influence on SDC’s analyses of the 
region. SDC should use the overview of multilateral organisations to target its future 
interventions and contributions where effectiveness is especially promising and where its 
comparative advantages can be fully used. 
 
2.3 Transversal Themes at the Level of the Regional Strategy and the Domains 
The relevance of the four transversal themes defined in the Regional Strategy – CSPM, 
gender equality, climate change, and disaster resilience - is doubtless. Their consideration 
by the Program’s implementation is to be assessed  
 
Conclusions 
- The large number of transversal themes (4) and their appropriate implementation 
requires efforts that appear to be currently beyond SDC’s resources. 
 
Recommendations 
- The number of transversal themes is to be reduced to what makes sense and can be 
implemented. This increases the chances that they can be fully taken up when 
planning and implementing projects and the Program as a whole. 
 
- Gender and DRR appear as good candidates to be maintained as transversal themes 
and to be applied best. The existing Credit Proposal’s checklists could also be adapted 
to the needs of the region and the SCOs. 
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- Conflict sensitive project and Program management is to be made a mandatory 
approach (not a transversal theme), orienting all Swiss activities in the region. 
The transversal themes are quite different in nature, and the Syria crisis may have 
relegated their importance momentarily. The Annual Report for 2013 does not make 
statements on achievements regarding the transversal themes. It can be assumed that 
gender equality and CSPM as well as disaster resilience are quite systematically 
considered when planning and implementing projects. They should therefore continue to 
orient Swiss interventions in the region. Climate change neutrality/adaptation, on the other 
hand, is currently not really addressed – although it is obviously a very important one, 
since the region is affected by climate change in various ways, the scarcity of the resource 
“water” being only the most obvious one. Open conflicts around water are a risk which 
contributes to the region’s fragility and which can be traced back, at least partly, to climate 
change. In view of implementing conflict sensitive project and program management more 
systematically, specific training is to become a requirement for all staff involved in the 
programme’s management. 
 
Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the Regional Strategy and its Portfolio 
– Choices “How to Do It” 
 
3.1 Management Performance 
The management structure of the RP IJLS is a complex one: HQ, the Office in Amman, 
comprised of the Regional and the Jordan Offices and of a total of 24 staff, and the Office 
in Beirut (previously also the Damascus Office) all participate in the steering of SDC’s 
interventions. In addition, two Global Programs (Water and Migration & Development) are 
active in the region, the latter also with one staff in the Amman Office. In addition, the RP 
is also in contact with the Jerusalem Office managing the SDC Program in the oPt – last 
not least because UNRWA is a partner for both Programs. 
 
Conclusions 
- SDC’s response to the Syria crisis has required additional efforts entailing additional 
management staff in its offices in the region. 
 
- The regional structure of SDC offices – a necessity under the current layout of the RP – 
together with HQ’s participation in the Program management (more intense than 




- Roles and responsibilities and lines of accountability among offices and people: need 
to be spelled out clearly for increased efficiency, effectiveness and smooth functioning. 
Discussions on strategic, institutional and personal aspects are not to be mixed. This 
especially applies in periods when important unplanned management tasks are to be 
realised – as is the response to the Syria crisis. Especially on short term projects the 
cross-consultations in the office and between offices and HQ has to be minimised, 
allowing for quick decision making. 
 
- Cooperation with single partners active throughout the region requires a coordinated 
approach to such actors. For instance, EMM is to speak in one single voice with 
UNRWA (the lead being with the Jerusalem SCO). 
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Management Challenges in the Reaction to the Syria Crisis 
The engine “RP IJLS” is at risk of overheating due the many additional tasks to be 
performed in reaction to the Syria crisis, to the integration of new staff in the offices, and 
to staff fluctuation (both Swiss and local). It is important that management is aware of this 
risk and adapts its procedures accordingly. 
The operational aspects highlighted in the graph below, are amongst the main criteria to 
be considered when organising the work of the SDC structures in the region. Minimising 
the risks of “overheating” the engine, potentially resulting in decreasing quality of work and 
dissatisfied staff, is an important management task. Choices are to be made which allow 
for an environment conducive to effective and efficient work. 
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Measures useful for cooling the overheated “engine RP” 
Reo II is not fully implemented in the region. The division of labour between HQ and the 
offices in the region still reserves large parts of responsibilities for managing support by 
Berne, where contributions to multilateral organisations are decided and followed. This 
results in the necessity for especially efficient communication. Due to the Syria crisis and 
the necessity to act fast, communication was sometimes perceived as unmethodical by 
SCOs. 
Regional Structure 
The Program management in the SDC Offices in the region and in HQ mastered the 
heavy workload stemming from the high number of projects, the political and media 
attention on the region and above all the Syria crisis. On top of that it appears that 
significant improvements were made on very often neglected administrative procedures 
such as filing (e.g. the evaluation team found it quite impressive how swiftly files could be 
Indicate the evalua-
tors’ assessment of 
the current state of 
decisions taken  
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provided). A major concern of the offices was the high staff turnover. The Amman Office 
especially saw quite a significant number of Swiss and local staff being replaced and new 
staff members join the team to manage SDC’s response to the Syria crisis. Moreover, in 
response to the difficulties to keep up-to-date with projects and country specific 
processes, more responsibilities were delegated to the country offices, which put the 
coordination among SDC structures to the test. 
Financial Planning Instruments 
The Program’s Financial Planning takes place on two levels. For the medium term, 
percentages of the overall budget are allocated to domains and to aid modalities (some of 
them managed by HQ, others by the offices in the region). In the short term, the allocation 
of financial resources reacts in ad hoc ways to the situation in the region and in single 
countries. This is exacerbated by the financial means made available for the Swiss 
response to the Syria crisis (20 Mio. CHF in June, 2013, alone; almost an annual budget 
of the initially planned regional Program, most of which is to be spent in 2013). This 
flexibility results, amongst other things, in an important number of Credit Proposals to be 
prepared, and in important management efforts. These could be reduced by developing 
fewer and larger projects under an umbrella type of arrangement. 
 
3.2 Quality of the Monitoring System 
The often short term nature of commitments and the subsequent important number of 
projects make the development of a monitoring system a challenging if not impossible 
business. The Program management had prepared a formal monitoring system, 
comprised also of monitoring sheets for the domains. But with the Syria crisis, the 
importance given to context monitoring – MERVs were established at a two monthly 
interval in 2012 – the use of such monitoring instruments was curtailed.  
 
Conclusions 
- The important number of projects and the emergency activities have reduced SCOs’ 
resources for monitoring and reporting. 
 
Recommendations 
- SDC’s monitoring is to be organised more selectively and differentiated according to 
project type. It is acceptable to rely at least in parts, on the monitoring of multilateral 
partners, possibly contributing to it through secondments. 
 
- The lessons learnt and other insights gained from the Program’s implementation are to 
be made more systematically available within EMM and SDC as well as to other actors. 
In the SDC contexts results are usually not the final product of a one to two year cycle but 
must be seen as a flow of information originating from activities which can date back 
several years. The monitoring of the Program is thus very much linked to the quality of the 
monitoring system of multilateral partners and in fact depends on them. Suggestions on 
how to adapt the system to both the particularities of the portfolio and the fragile situation 
are interesting issues for further institutional discussion and learning. The topic of 
programmatic, security related risk management is also to be addressed. One possibility 
to develop the monitoring consists in supporting multilateral organisations’ monitoring 
systems by providing secondments specialised in this area, that would benefit the 
multilateral organisations and SDC’s monitoring at the same time. Meanwhile, and for the 
present portfolio, monitoring is to proceed selectively, identifying the information to be 
made available for the Program’s steering, and relegating other information to a 
secondary level of importance. 
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The knowledge management within the SDC structures in the region is not systematic. 
The communication of lessons learnt and of good practices within EMM is especially 
important when staff rotation is high, and when the set-up is a regional one, involving 
large number of staff who often does not interact directly. 
 
3.3 Coordination and Aid Effectiveness in the Regional Set-Up 
Donor Coordination is a precondition for aid effectiveness. In a regional set-up marked by 
continuous emergency responses such coordination faces specific challenges that are to 
be dealt with, first of all, through optimum coordination within SDC’s regional structures. 
 
Conclusions 
- Switzerland is a small but well appreciated donor that participates constructively but 
selectively in donor coordination and that can play a leading role regarding innovative 
approaches. 
 
- Switzerland is a comparatively small actor in the region, but it is regarded by local and 
international actors as playing a positive role, especially within the framework of 




- Coordination (in view of maximised aid effectiveness and a coherent presence of SDC 
within the region) is to start within SDC. The structures in the region and HQ are to 
communicate relevant information quickly and in appropriate ways. 
SDC participates in donor working groups and has well established contacts with other 
donors; organising coordination remains the task of multilateral organisations (UNHCR, 
UNDP, and OCHA). In Jordan, SDC chaired the donor coordination for supporting the 
Syrian refugees, and thus played an important role in making the aid of the many actors 
involved more efficient. 
With its approach to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon, where Lebanese hosting families are 
supported by stabilising their capacity to host Syrian refugees over long phases, the Swiss 
Program introduced an innovation that sharpens the intervention’s profile (also see below, 
paragraph 4.2). 
The flows of information within SDC (between Offices in the region (including oPt), with 
HQ) are not always perceived as optimum by the actors involved. Quick transmission of 
information – e.g. about strategic options, the conditionality attached to the provision of 
financial resources and, more generally, the situation in the region, the experience made 
with single partners – needs to be shared in ways allowing for swift and efficient working 
and for coherent approaches in the region. During emergency situations and in times of 
stress, the quality of information flows is especially important in order to guarantee the 




Evaluation Area 4:  Results of the Regional Strategy – in Relation to the 
Results at the Levels of Countries and of the Region – Choices “What to 
achieve” 
 
4.1 Results and Effectiveness / Swiss Contribution to Country (Regional) 
Results 
The measuring of results against local strategies is not easily achieved in a region and in 
countries where planning capacities of local actors are limited (mainly due to poor human 
and financial resources and the overall fragile context). An efficient monitoring which 
adequately and realistically plans the resources required for this task can enhance the 
quality of reporting on the Program’s effectiveness. 
 
Conclusions 
- The RP IJLS is on its way to achieve its initially targeted results. With its participation in 
the international response to the Syria crisis – both through multilateral channels, other 
partners and by self-implemented projects – the RP also contributes to the alleviation 
of the emergency situation of Syrian refugees. 
 
- Switzerland’s involvement in Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness both in 
Lebanon and in Jordan emerge as very significant contributions. In Jordan, a full-
fledged system is in place, in Lebanon the basis for such a system are laid with the 
support provided (through UNDP) for the establishment of a national action plan. 
 
Recommendations 
- Results at output level are to be interpreted so as to provide hints about the outcomes 
and even the impact of SDC interventions. As for monitoring, the assessment of the 
Program’s effectiveness is also to make use of supported (multilateral and other) 
organisation’s reporting on achievements. 
The Program’s reporting indicates “very satisfactory” and “satisfactory” achievements at 
the outcome level. Reporting mainly stresses the output level, though. The quality of 
reporting on results can be further developed by providing interpretations of the results at 
output level. And it can rely on multilateral organisations’ reporting to which SDC has 
contributed. The outcomes on which they report and the impacts of their efforts can be 
emphasised, and the Swiss contributions to these achievements are to be stated (see 
also above, paragraph 3.2). 
Monitoring and reporting on SDC’s activities in the region would be made easier if the 
portfolio showed a clearer profile. The issue is not to group the large number of projects, 
but to give the domains of intervention more profile (strengthening the program approach, 
fewer projects, longer lasting projects, projects with bigger financial volumes, etc. – see 
also above, paragraph 2.1). The future planning, especially the definition of a new CS, is 
to consider this dimension, reduce the number of domains of intervention and sharpen 
their definition. This would also help the programme to respect the principles of good 
humanitarian donorship even more thoroughly. 
 
4.2 Sustainability and Scaling-Up 
The sustainability of humanitarian aid – especially when it reacts to emergency situations 
– is often not the first concern – saving lives and alleviating the suffering of victims is a 
priority in the short term. Still, with the increasingly protracted situation, sustainability as 
well as potentials for scaling-up approaches gain in importance. Especially in politically 




- SDC’s support to Jordan’s efforts for Disaster Risk Reduction is likely to be 
sustainable, since the respective projects targeted institution building. 
 
- Support to UNRWA’s organisational development is an important thrust to achieve 
sustainable results. At the same time, UNRWA, besides many positive aspects and the 
paramount importance of its mandate, as a large institution, comes with a history of 
heavy bureaucracy and partly non-innovative staff. 
 
- The reaction to the Syria crisis does not consider scaling-up potentials of single 
projects priority. Still, in Lebanon, the replication of the approach “cash for hosting” was 
taken up or is in the process of being replicated by other bi- and multilateral actors 
(Poland, UNHCR). 
Recommendations 
- The sustainability of interventions is to be prepared mainly by capacitating local 
partners – both Government units and NGOs. This implies intensive cooperation with 
selected partners and the channelling of support through these actors whenever 
possible. 
 
- The scaling-up of selected interventions (not all project have respective potentials) is to 
be foreseen as early as the planning phase, and these projects are to actively prepare 
and promote the rolling-out of successful interventions (realised by SDC itself and/or by 
other actors). 
Sustainability 
It appears that SDC’s steady support efforts have contributed to improving the UNRWA’s 
management capacities – although these require continued support, and although the 
organisation’s performance continues to be criticised. The abovementioned support to 
Jordan’s DRR body is an additional example of support resulting in sustainable 
improvement of local capacities. Sustainability of interventions can also be strengthened 
by contributing to the transformation of the contexts the program is active in, e.g. by 
strengthening the capacities of local actors and by working on the regulatory framework 
for the protection of citizens. A changed, more stable context is more likely to absorb 
external support more sustainably. 
Scaling-Up 
The scaling-up of activities co-funded by SDC and implemented by other organisations, 
multilateral ones especially, is usually outside the Program’s reach. The replication of 
successful approaches which can be realised by SDC mainly concerns the modalities 
“bilateral cooperation” and “direct actions”. The scaling-up of the “cash for hosting” 
approach in Lebanon was made possible by an open sharing of SDC’s experiences and 
ways of working with other agencies seeking to support families hosting Syrian refugees. 
The SDC promotion and strengthening of DRR in Jordan also have an important potential 
for scaling-up – through support provided to the rolling-out of DRR structures and 
mechanisms by local actors. 
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Appendix 1: Evaluation Matrix 
 
Evaluation Area 1: Context Analysis (referring to the partner countries’ and to the 
Swiss context) 
EMM’s Questions 
• Syrian crisis: How did SDC react to the constant deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation and crisis in Syria and the region (Strategy, operation, Human Resources 
etc.)? 
• Has the volatile and fragile context been sufficiently taken into consideration in the 
Program implementation? 
• Has the “do no harm approach” been well respected? 
1.1 Positioning and adaption of the Strategy with respect to the countries and regional 
context and Swiss policies 
114 What were the most important changes in the context and what has been their effect 
on the CS, and what adaptations have been taken? 
1.2 Quality of context analysis 
121 How realistic and relevant is the context analysis? How the broad political context is 
assessed in the CS and ARs? Does the analysis include issues such as social and 
economic inequality, power relations, regional disparities, the state apparatus, the 
political parties, institutions and powers? 
 
Evaluation Area 2: Coherence of project / Program portfolio 
EMM’s Questions 
• How effective was the regional approach and its application (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria and newly Turkey)? Recommendations for improvement. 
• How has SDC applied the BUSAN principle of “act fast but stay engaged” to adapt its 
Program to the context of humanitarian crisis in the region. 
• Application of the comprehensive aid approach (CAA): What are the indications that the 
CAA is well applied? Where is potential for improvement? Which are the 
supporting/hindering factors for the implementation of the CAA? 
• How flexible are SDC activities and portfolio according to the changes and challenges 
in each country and the region? 
2.1 Relevance of the projects / Program portfolio 
211 How is the project/Program portfolio structured? 
2.1 Consistency of projects/Program objectives with Results Framework of the domain 
221 How is the project/Program portfolio aligned with the results frameworks of the 
domains/sub-domains of the CS? 
2.3 Transversal themes at the level of CS and the domains 
231 How relevant are the selected transversal themes and how are they integrated in the 
CS and the domains? 
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Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the CS or MTP, and their portfolio 
EMM’s Questions 
• Program implementation and REO II process: How well are the challenges handled in 
the field?  
• How do you assess the financial planning tools for the RO? (H-cash, Multi-funding, 0,5 
% water money). Are the financial instruments appropriate and in line with the CS? 
• Is the regional structure of SDC efficient? 
• The regional Program IJSL is not eligible for regional cooperation funding (RZ) along 
the lines of the parliamentary bill, nevertheless the CAA is included in the CS. The 
current situation and the mid- and long-term prognostics require a more comprehensive 
approach including development interventions. Recommendations in this respect. 
• If applicable given the short duration of the mission: What are thematic areas/ activities 
/domains recommended to be included and/or scaled up or/and merged in the future 
strategy (i.e. Water/DRR; Protection/Migration). 
• Relevance of the domain approach/continuation in the future CS? Recommendations. 
3.2 Management Performance 
321 How are decisions for steering the country Program made if the results differ 
considerably from planning? 
3.3 Quality of the Monitoring System 
3.4 Coordination and aid effectiveness in the country set up 
341 Which role does SDC play within the donor community? 
342 Which information and through which mechanisms is the achievement of results 
shared with the governments of the partner countries, the Swiss community (incl. 
SDC’s networks), other relevant stakeholders? 
344 “WOGA” Which are the areas where coordination and synergies with other Swiss 
governmental agencies are well achieved? Are there gaps? Recommendations for 
improvement and future WOGA Strategy? 
 In view of the future integration of SDC offices into the Embassies, what are main 
factors to be considered following a regional approach? 
 
Evaluation Area 4: Results of the CS – in relation to the results at country level 
EMM’s Questions 
• How to group more than 100 projects in three domains and five countries so that 
meaningful expected results can be formulated? Recommendations in this respect. 
• Were the principles of good humanitarian donorship respected? 
4.1 Domain Results, Effectiveness and Contribution to Country Results (CS follows 
regional approach) 
413 To what extent have the Swiss portfolio results (outcomes) of the different domains 
and transversal themes been achieved? Or what is the likelihood to achieve them? 
415 How significant is the Swiss contribution to the achieved results at country level for 
the different domains? 
4.2 Sustainability and scaling up 




Appendix 2: Persons Consulted 
 
Switzerland 
Christian Eggs, Global Program Water Initiatives 
Pierre-Yves Fux, FDFA 
Anita Kälin, FDFA 
Konstantin Obolensky, FDFA 
Björn Schranz, SDC, Program Officer EMM 
Beat von Däniken, SDC, former Regional Director of Cooperation Amman 
Rudi von Planta, SDC, Deputy Head of EMM 
Thomas Rüegg, Global Program Migration and Development 
 
Lebanon 
Abdelnasser el Ayi, Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Project Manager 
Fadil Abilmonna, UNDP, Program Analyst 
Hala Acouri, SDC, Administrative / Finance Officer 
Jacco Bos, Embassy of the Netherlands in Lebanon 
Fatima Amine, SDC, Finance & Admin Assistant 
Soumaya Berri, SDC, National Program Officer 
Fabrizio Carboni, ICRC, Head of Delegation 
Jean-Paul Cavalieri, UNHCR, Deputy Representative 
Roger Davies, UNRWA, Deputy Director in Lebanon 
Ruth Flint, Ambassade de Suisse au Liban, Ambassadeur 
Scarlett Haddad, journaliste 
Heba Hage Felder, SDC, Director of Coopertion,  
Karl-Friedrich Glombitza, SDC, Project Manager 
Lina Hamdan, Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Communication & Strategy 
Advisor 
Khalil Hasan, UNRWA, Donor relations and projects officer 
Stine Horn, Norwegian Embassy, First Secretary 
Nabih Jabr, Croix Rouge Libanaise, Directeur adjoint Département EMS 
Michelle Jalkh, SDC, Project Assistant 
Dalia Lakiss, SDC, National Program Officer 
Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson, Embassy of Sweden, First Secretary 
Simon Little, British Embassy Lebanon, Humanitarian Advisor 
Rafael Knus, SDC, Program Assistant Finance 
Robert Nicolas, National Program Officer 
Isabelle Peillen, Mada 
Maureen Philippon, EU Delegation Lebanon, Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection – ECHO, Technical Assistant 
Luca Portacolone, Cooperazione italiana allo sviluppo 
Luca Renda, UNDP, Country Director 
Boris Richard, Embassy of Switzerland in Lebanon, Deputy Chief of Mission 
Shombi Sharp, UNDP, Deputy Country Director 





Carlos Afonso, ECHO 
Mahmoud Akrabawi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General of the Department of 
Palestinian Affairs 
Majida Alassaf, UNDP 
Zena Ali-Ahmad, UNDP, Country Director 
Khaled Awamieh, Arab Governance Centre, Founder and Board Member 
Mohammad Barakat, SDC, NPO Basic Services and Livelihoods 
Thomas Böni, SDC, Regional Head of Finance and Administration 
Vincent Cauche, Terre des hommes, Delagate 
Irene Fellmann, German Embassy, Development Counselor  
Gloria Fernandez, ECHO 
Giacomo Hijazin, US Embassy, Bureau Population, Refugees and Migration 
Maha Homsi, UNICEF, ECD/Child Protection 
Sami Hourani, Leaders of Tomorrow 
Ali Kassay, Ace House 
Randa Kuhail, SDC, Program Assistant 
Daoud Kuttab, Community Media Network, General Director 
Miriam Lopez, Medair, Project Manager 
Claudia Niederer, SDC, Program Officer 
Caroline Pontefact, UNRWA, Director of Education 
Pascal Raess, SDC, Program Officer GPMD 
Mariza Rogers, US Office for Disaster Assistance response Team / USAID 
Marco Rossi, SDC, Regional Director of Cooperation 
Volker Schimmel, UHCR 
Anna Segall, UNRWA, Acting Director 
Michele Servati, UNICEF 
Sarwar Shehryar, Canadian Embassy, Counsellor, Development Cooperation  
Iesha Singh, DFID 
Paul Stromberg, UNHCR 
Lea Valaulta, SDC, Director of Cooperation Jordan, Iraq & Deputy Regional Director 
Michael Winzap, Swiss Embassy in Jordan, Ambassador 




Appendix 3 Program of the Field Visits 
 
 Lebanon 
17.11. − Visit to the Bekaa Valley 
17.11. − General briefing at SDC 
− Discussion with SCO staff 
− UNDP 
− Lunch with Swiss Embassy staff 
− Discussio n with SCO staff 
18.11. − UNRWA and Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee 
− UNICEF 
− Political Analyst 
19.11. − ICRC 
− Red Cross 
− SDC Cash for hosting project 
− Like minded donors 
− Debriefing 
 Jordan 
20.11. − General briefing at SDC 
− Discussion with Staff 




− Team BS & L 
− Team Protection 
21.11. Team A 
− UNRWA 









24.11. Team A 
− Team DRR 
− GP Migration 
Team B 
− Jordan Civil Defense 
− OXFAM 
− Dinner with like-minded donors 
25.11. Team A 
− Baqaa School 
− Jerash Camp 
Team B 
− SRK 






Appendix 4: Documents and Websites Consulted 
Documents 
Linde, Thomas: Concept Note: SDC’s Support of Cross-border Assistance for the Syrian 
People in Need. 2013 
Schweizerischer Bundesrat: Botschaft über die Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2013–
2016. 15. February 2012 
SDC: Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts, 2012 
SDC: Consolidated Statements 2010-2012 
SDC: Cooperation Strategy Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010-2014 
SDC: ICS Reports 2010 
SDC: ICS Reports 2011 
SDC: ICS Reports 2012 
SDC: ICS Reports 2013 
SDC: MERVs Iraq 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
SDC: MERVs Jordan 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
SDC: MERVs Lebanon 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
SDC: MERVs Syria 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
SDC: Office Management Reports 2010-2012 
SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2013 
SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2011 
SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2012 
SDC Regional Office in Amman:  Quarterly Report 04.2012. Period covered: February 
2012 – April 2012 
SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2013 
Swiss Regional Office Amman: Mid Term Review (2012) of the Cooperation Strategy Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010-2014 
UNDP: Improved Government Response to Crisis and Major Civilian Operations . 
Technical Support to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on Disaster Risk 
Management. September 2013 
United Nations: Towards a Comprehensive Regional Strategy. Dealing with the effects of 





















Appendix 5: Projects in Reaction to the Syria Crisis (until October, 2013) 
Project/WBS Description Resp.Person Organ. Unit Geographic Focus Domain Budget 
7F-07940 JOR UNHCR Cash Assist. Syrian Refugee Coord.Office Amman SCO Amman Jordan BSL 430'000 
7F-08097 JOR MOE/SDC Sch. rehab. Syrian refuge Coord.Office Amman SCO Amman Jordan BSL 1'035'000 
7F-08370 UNICEF Programmbeiträge HH Jay Edouard E/MM Regional BSL 800'000 
7F-08404 SYR FAO Emergency Response Schranz Björn E/MM Syria BSL 792'000 
7F-08518 LEB UNICEF Back to School Campaign Coord.Office Beirut SCPO Beirut Lebanon BSL 300'000 
7F-08519 SYR HI Emerg response injured in N.Syria Coord.Office Amman SCO Amman Syria BSL 403'745 
7F-08555 SYR JRS NFI for IDPs Von Däniken Beat SCO Amman Syria BSL 300'000 
7F-08556 SYR SIF NFI for IDPs Von Däniken Beat SCO Amman Syria BSL 100'000 
7F-08619 SYR-Etana Press-Support IDP families Von Däniken Beat SCO Amman Syria BSL 182'800 
7F-08627 SYR - UNHCR - Winter Assistance NFI Von Däniken Beat SCO Amman Syria BSL 1'400'000 
7F-08651 UNHCR - Reg. - add. contr. Syrian ref. Coord.Office Amman E/MM Regional BSL 1'700'000 
7F-08689 Crossboarder Assist. SYR Civil Society SCO Amman SCO Amman Syria BSL 4'000'000 
7F-08690 UNRWA Syria Crisis Response Jan-Jun 2013 SCPO Beirut SCPO Beirut Lebanon BSL 285'000 
7F-08712 JOR SRC Cash Assistance Syr Refugees SCO Amman SCO Amman Jordan BSL 600'000 
7F-08897 JOR Medair Assistance to Syrian Ref. SCO Amman E/MM Jordan BSL 600'000 
7F-08898 Reg UNRWA Cash Assistance to PalRef. SCO Amman E/MM Regional BSL 2'000'000 
7F-08899 UNHCR  Sammel KRA SCO Amman SCO Amman Regional BSL 2'000'000 
7F-08903 LEB UNFPA Gender Based Violence SCO Amman SCPO Beirut Lebanon BSL 500'000 
7F-01556 UNHCR – NothilfeProgram Kiener Eliane E/MM Regional Protection 9'820'000 
7F-07936 LEB DirA Support Fam hosting Syrians SCPO Beirut SCPO Beirut Lebanon Protection 8'330'000 
7F-07939 JOR UNICEF protect displ Syrian children Coord.Office Amman SCO Amman Jordan Protection 500'000 
7F-08436 SYR UNOCHA Schranz Björn SCO Amman Mashreq Protection 273'000 
7F-08538 UNHCR Experts Schranz Björn SCO Amman Jordan Protection 500'000 
7F-08557 UNICEF - Reg - Protection-Watsan Coord.Office Amman SCO Amman Mashreq Protection 1'000'000 
7F-08558 JOR IOM Border transit assistance Coord.Office Amman SCO Amman Jordan Protection 300'000 
7F-08760 LEB Salam Support to Syrian IDPs & refug SCPO Beirut SCPO Beirut Syria Protection 199'747 
7F-08764 OCHA Programmbeiträge HH Veillard Reynald E/MM Regional Protection 700'000 
7F-08864 Irq DRC Emergency Asst. for Syrian Ref. SCO Amman E/MM Iraq Protection 600'000 
7F-08892 JOR UNICEF PRO Syr Chidren Host Com. SCO Amman E/MM Jordan Protection 500'000 
7F-08904 UN Secondments 20 Mio SCO Amman SCO Amman Jordan Protection 900'000 




Appendix 6: All Projects and their Duration 
It is to be noted that the indication about project’s duration often are comprised of several 
phases, each of which was prepared by a separate Credit Proposal. 
Project Description Domain 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Basic Services & Livelihoods       
7F-01608 SYRIEN Institution Building GAPAR BSL           
7F-02837 IKRK - Programmbeiträge/Nothilfe BSL           
7F-03297 PALÄSTINA/JEMEN/SYRIEN  WFP  Beiträge BSL           
7F-03539 JORDANIEN Dep. of Palestinian Affairs BSL           
7F-04341 UNRWA, Secondment F. Fröhlich BSL           
7F-05396 Global - TdHL - HH Programmbeiträge BSL           
7F-05779 IRAK Ref UNHCRSecondment Shelter BSL           
7F-05879 LIBANON UNRWA Secondment M & E BSL           
7F-06036 Leb. UNRWA Secondment Infrastructure BSL           
7F-06108 Mashreq REG Small Studies+Consultancies BSL           
7F-06147 SYRIA UNRWA Camps for Pal Ref from Iraq BSL           
7F-06838 Lebanon UNRWA ILO Employment Center BSL           
7F-06842 Leb. UNDP HABITAT Building Structures BSL           
7F-06956 UNRWA Review Educational Program BSL           
7F-06962 UNRWA:HILFE FUER PALAEST. FLUECHTL. BSL           
7F-07064 RéseauEntrepr.Solidaires - Milchprodukte BSL           
7F-07448 MIDDLE EAST UNRWA Secondments BSL           
7F-07522 Leb, UNRWA Secondm. Environm.Health BSL           
7F-07533 Middle East Embassy Small Grants BSL           
7F-07608 UNRWA Survey Living Conditions BSL           
7F-07663 UNRWA  Earmarked OD Projects BSL           
7F-07666 JORDAN UNRWA School Baqa'a BSL           
7F-07805 SYRIA UNDP NGO Platform BSL           
7F-07937 SYR UNRWA Cash assistance BSL           
7F-07940 JOR UNHCR Cash Assist. Syrian Refugee BSL           
7F-08017 JORDAN UNRWA Fafo Socio-eco. profile BSL           
7F-08096 JOR Water Sanitation Jerash BSL           
7F-08097 JOR MOE/SDC Sch. rehab. Syrian refuge BSL           
7F-08098 LEB UNRWA Watermanagment Camps BSL           
7F-08099 LEB Tahaddi Prot./Emp. marginalized comm BSL           
7F-08175 SYR Cash Assist. UNRWA PalRef Latakia BSL           
7F-08212 LesSarments de Lavaux  - Milchprodukte BSL           
7F-08300 SYRIA UNICEF Psycho-Social Rehab BSL           
7F-08347 UNRWA technical backstopping selfhelp BSL           
7F-08370 UNICEF Programmbeiträge HH BSL           
7F-08404 SYR FAO Emergency Response BSL           
7F-08518 LEB UNICEF Back to School Campaign BSL           
7F-08519 SYR HI Emerg. response injured in N.Syria BSL           
7F-08555 SYR JRS NFI for IDPs BSL           
7F-08556 SYR SIF NFI for IDPs BSL           
7F-08567 REG ILO UNRWA TVET expert BSL           
7F-08619 SYR-Etana Press-Support IDP families BSL           
7F-08627 SYR - UNHCR - Winter Assistance NFI BSL           
7F-08651 UNHCR - Reg. - add. contr. Syrian ref. BSL           
7F-08689 Crossboarder Assist. SYR Civil Society BSL           
7F-08690 UNRWA Syria Crisis Response Jan-Jun 2013 BSL           
7F-08707 JOR Care/Save Vuln. youth employment BSL           
7F-08712 JOR SRC Cash Assistance Syr Refugees BSL           
7F-08881 SYR WFP Emergency Food Assist. SHARP BSL           
7F-08889 JOR UNDP Mitigating Impact Host Com. BSL           
7F-08897 JOR Medair Assistance to Syrian Ref. BSL           
7F-08898 Reg UNRWA Cash Assistance to PalRef. BSL           
7F-08899 UNHCR  Sammel KRA BSL           
7F-08903 LEB UNFPA Gender Based Violence BSL           
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7F-00627 Syrien UNRWA Projekte Camprehabilitation BSL           
Disaster Risk Reduction 
 
          
7F-02503 JORDANIEN RSS Seismic Hazard Mitigation DRR           
7F-02680 IRAK NCCI Capacity Building DRR           
7F-03540 JORDANIEN Ministry of Civil Defense DRR           
7F-05395 JORDAN Seismic Design of Buildings JEA DRR           
7F-05460 JORDAN UNDP Risk Assessment Aqaba DRR           
7F-05693 LEBANON LRCS Emergency Services DRR           
7F-06831 Leb. Awareness Earthquake Risk School DRR           
7F-06837 JORDAN Earthquake Awareness Campaign DRR           
7F-06840 SYRIA DRR Bachmann Broschüre DRR           
7F-06841 REG LEB/JOR UNICEF DRR Edu Schools DRR           
7F-06843 LEBANON School Rehabilitation DRR           
7F-06846 LEBANON Seismic Design of Buildings DRR     ???     
7F-07130 SYRIA FAO Early Warning System Drought DRR           
7F-07206 Syria UNDP DRR Risk Management DRR           
7F-07212 SYRIA, SARC, Community based DRR DRR           
7F-07566 Libanon, LRC, Emerg. Medical Services DRR           
7F-07574 JORDAN UNDP Secondment DRM DRR           
7F-07586 LEBANON UNICEF WASH Expert DRR           
7F-07718 JORDAN GAM Strengthening Capacities DRR           
7F-08572 LRCS: MCI - first responsder capacities DRR           
Protection 
 
          
7F-01556 UNHCR – NothilfeProgram Protection           
7F-06310 LEBANON Caritas, Migrants Center Protection           
7F-06430 LEBANON ILO Palestinian Women Protection           
7F-06830 SYRIA UNICEF SGBV Prevention Iraq Refug Protection           
7F-06844 LEBANON UNDP Support to  LPDC Protection           
7F-07651 SYRIA ACF Learning Skills Iraqi Refugees Protection           
7F-07657 LEBANON ILO Secondment M & E Officer Protection           
7F-07664 IRAQ OXFAM Social Protection Women Protection           
7F-07665 LEBANON Roumieh Prison Rehabilitation Protection           
7F-07667 IRAK Caritas Protection of Women Protection           
7F-07668 Middle East UNICEF Child Protection Protection           
7F-07669 LEB DRC Empowerment of women at risk Protection           
7F-07670 SYR UNHCR Secondmt. Community Officer Protection           
7F-07936 LEB DirA Support Fam hosting Syrians Protection           
7F-07938 SYRIA DRC Protection Womens Rights Protection           
7F-07939 JOR UNICEF protect displ Syrian children Protection           
7F-08080 Emergency response to Syrian Refugees Protection           
7F-08436 SYR UNOCHA Protection           
7F-08492 LEB FSD Explosive Remnants War Clearance Protection           
7F-08538 UNHCR Experts Protection           
7F-08547 LEB INSAN Social Pro through Educ Empwt Protection           
7F-08557 UNICEF - Reg - Protection-Watsan Protection           
7F-08558 JOR IOM Border transit assistance Protection           
7F-08708 IRQ Women/Children/Civil Society Protection           
7F-08760 LEB Salam Support to Syrian IDPs & refug Protection           
7F-08764 OCHA Programmbeiträge HH Protection           
7F-08864 Irq DRC Emergency Asst. for Syrian Ref. Protection           
7F-08882 Project Bleu / Pipeline Middle East Protection           
7F-08888 Irq WC PRO Children in Contact with Law Protection           
7F-08892 JOR UNICEF PRO Syr Chidren Host Com. Protection           
7F-08904 UN Secondments 20 Mio Protection           
Non-Domain Projects („other“) 
 
          
7F-05685 IRAK MDM Formation Médicale 
 
          
7F-06829 IRAQ Handicap Int. Assistance Disabled 
 
          
7F-01035 Progr. de relève -niveau I – Humanitaire 
 
          
7F-01688 Post Conflict Development Assistance 
 
          
7F-02694 SYRIE/JORDANIE: HAZARD 
 
          
7F-02760 CICP: Juvenile Justice System Lebanon 
 
???         
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7F-03118 Eco-Tourism in the Mashreq Region 
 
          
7F-05177 SYRIA Hiking Trails - Forgotten Cities 
 
          
7F-05187 Syr: Combat Human Trafficking 
 
???         
7F-05617 LIBANON SOS Futures Mamans 
 
          
7F-05946 LEB: UNODC Support to Penal Reform 
 
  ???       
7F-07632 Program der Sektion E+C ab 2010 
 
          
7F-08349 DRR Conference in Aqaba 
 
          
7F-08754 Secondment OCHA CMCoord Officer (TBC) 
 
          
Global Programs 
 
          
7F-07691 JPO Volée Bereich GZ Migration           
7F-07086 Water Security in the Middle East Water           
7F-07689 Water Security in the Middle East Water           
7F-03572 LEB: UNODC Combat Human Trafficking Migration           
7F-07151 Syria: DRC Prot. Iraqi Refugee Women Migration           
7F-07732 Improving Labour Migration Middle East Migration           
7F-07887 Open. Activities Labour Migr Middle East Migration           
Offices and Small Projects 
 
          
7F-06833 Middle East Small Grants Sub-Regional 
 
          
7F-00010 Büro Amman 
 
          
7F-04400 Program Office Damascus 
 
          
7F-04635 Middle East Regional Small Grants & Cons 
 
???         
7F-04895 Small Pilot Projects SDC Damascus 
 
          
7F-07011 LEBANON Program Office Beirut 
 
          
7F-07533 Middle East Embassy Small Grants 
 




Appendix 7: Structure of the Regional Program’s Portfolio 
 
 
































Disbursments by Domain and Number of Projects p.a. 












































Disbursments by Size of Financial Volume of Projects p.a. 







Appendix 8: Intervention Logics 
In brief discussions, the staff of the SDC Office in Amman confirmed the intervention logic 


















































“ to be considered at all levels 
Living conditions are improved for 
refugees, IDPs, vulnerable groups 
and vulnerable migrants. 






Capacity of service pro-
viders in delivering basic 
services is improved 
through institutional 
development and policy 
dialogue. 
Access to quality basic 
services is improved 
through efficient delivery 
and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships 
Access to employment 
and income, (in particu-
lar for women and 
youth) is improved 
through adequate edu-













proaches such as 
business environ-





lopment of partners 
(UNRWA) for effi-






















































Capacity and conditions to exercise 
rights are improved for refugees, 
IDPs, vulnerable groups and 
vulnerable migrants. 
Government capacity to 
address refugee and 
migration issues is 
strengthened. 
Legal status of refu-
gees, IDPs and vulnera-
ble migrants, in particu-
lar women and children, 
is improved and their 
basic rights protected. 
Access to job market is 
improved through amen-
ded labour legislations 
and regulatory environ-
ment. 




dialogue with key 





Advocacy for the 
respect of IHL, and 
rights and protection 




Cooperation with key 
regional partners on 
protection of refu-
gees and migrants, 






Appendix 9: Basic Statistical Data (2012, unless indicated otherwise) 
 
 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Syria 
     












at birth women 73 75 75 78 
Life expectance 
at birth men 68 72 71 74 
     
Area in km2 438,317 89,342 10,425 186,475 
     
GDP $ 210.3 billion $31.24 billion $ 42.95 billion $ 73.67 billion 
GNI per capita $ 5,870 $ 4,720 $ 9,190 $ 2,610 
Poverty 
headcount ratio 22.9% 13.3%   




131 100 72 116 
     
C02 emission 










Sources: World Bank, UNDP 
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